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# ESG and corporate credit spreads

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


## ESG risks and opportunities in fixed-income

Volkswagen 5y CDS spreads (bp)




Z-spreads of Nike 3.625% MAY-2043 fixed coupon bond (bp)



**ESG awareness changes stakeholder behavior affecting future expected cash flows and credit risks**

## ESG, firm value and credit risk

- **Merton model (1974): Value of firm's debt depends on**
  - risk-free loan and
  - short put option on firm's assets with loan's nominal as strike price
- **Risk-mitigation view**
  - Lower recruiting costs (Albuquerque et al., 2018), less risks stemming from natural disasters or regulatory changes (Renneboog et al., 2008), customer loyalty, higher product prices, etc.
  - ESG investments reduce ESG risks → higher/less volatile cash flows → lower put value → lower credit spread
- **Over-investment view**
  - Agency conflicts between management and shareholders (Goss & Roberts, 2011), costly maintenance of stakeholders relationships (Perez-Batres et al., 2012), ESG to distract from corporate misbehavior (Kim et al., 2014)
  - ESG investments are a waste of scarce resources → lower cash flows → higher put value → higher credit spread



## Research questions and contribution

1. Is ESG a determinant of credit spreads in the cross-section of firms?
2. Is the time-varying market valuation of ESG a determinant of CDS spread changes?

➡ **Determinants of CDS spreads and CDS spread changes** (Ericsson et al., 2009 & Galil et al., 2014)

➡ **New insights regarding ESG and credit risk in Europe**

## Literature on ESG and tradable corporate debt securities

Authors	Data	Period	Region	ESG pillar	Risk mitigation vs. overinvestment
Oikonomou et al. (2014)	Corporate bonds and credit ratings	1993-2008	U.S.	ESG	Risk mitigation
Ge and Liu (2015)	Corporate bonds and credit ratings	1992-2009	U.S.	ESG	Risk mitigation
Jiraporn et al. (2014)	Credit ratings	1995-2007	U.S.	ESG	Risk mitigation
Graham et al. (2001)	Credit ratings	1986-1997	U.S.	E	Risk mitigation
Bauer and Hann (2010)	Corporate bonds	1995-2006	U.S.	E	Risk mitigation
Schneider (2011)	Corporate bonds	1994-2004	U.S.	E	Risk mitigation
Bauer et al. (2009)	Corporate bonds and credit ratings	1995-2006	U.S.	S	Risk mitigation
Chen et al. (2012)	Corporate bonds	1973-1998	U.S.	S	Risk mitigation
Klock et al. (2005)	Corporate bonds	1990-2000	U.S.	G	Risk mitigation
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006)	Credit Ratings	2002-2003	U.S.	G	Risk mitigation
Bradley et al. (2007)	Corporate bonds and credit ratings	2001-2007	U.S.	G	Risk mitigation
Cremers et al. (2007)	Corporate bonds and credit ratings	1990-1997	U.S.	G	Risk mitigation
Menz (2010)	Corporate bonds	2004-2007	<b>Europe</b>	<b>ESG</b>	Overinvestment (weak evidence)
Stellner et al. (2015)	Corporate bonds	2006-2012	<b>Eurozone</b>	<b>ESG</b>	Risk mitigation (weak evidence)
Akdogu and Alp (2016)	<b>CDS (Bloomberg)</b>	2001-2006	U.S.	G	Risk mitigation
Switzer et al. (2018)	<b>CDS of financials (Markit)</b>	2010-2012	<b>World ex U.S.</b>	G	Risk mitigation

➡ Compared to bonds, **CDS** are more frequently **traded, standardized** and a precise **measure of credit risk**  
(Ericsson et al., 2009, Ederington et al., 2015, Norden & Weber, 2009, Finnerty et al., 2013)

➡ **Relationship between CDS spreads and E-, S- and G-ratings of European firms**


## Data

- **All data from Thomson Reuters EIKON for the period 31.07.2009 – 31.12.2016**
- **CDS spreads of Eurozone-firms**
  - Month-end mid spreads of 5y single-name CDS, denominated in EUR, senior unsecured debt
  - Filter: Financial firms and spreads > 2.000 bp (Zhang et al., 2009)
- **Firm characteristics**
  - Credit ratings: S&P, Moody's and Fitch (last updated), Filter: defaulted firms
  - Monthly stock returns, 180d-rolling-volatilities of stock returns
  - Leverage ratios:

$$\frac{\text{Book value of debt}_{i,t}}{\text{Equity market value}_{i,t} + \text{Book value of debt}_{i,t}}$$

# Data

- Thomson Reuters ESG ratings



- Percentile ratings
  - E- and S-ratings industry-benchmarked
  - G-ratings country-benchmarked
- Updated on 1<sup>st</sup> Jan each year
- No changes in methodology during sample period

## Research questions

### 1. Is ESG a determinant of credit spreads in the cross-section of firms?

- Apply ESG ratings to explain credit spreads → Fama-MacBeth regressions
- Consideration of 10 ESG category scores and subperiods

### 2. Is the time-varying market valuation of ESG a determinant of CDS spread changes?

- Fama and French-style ESG factors to capture time-varying market valuation of ESG impact on credit risk
- Time-series regressions of spread changes explained by ESG factors and controls



## Fama-MacBeth regressions with ESG dummy variables

- For each  $t$ :  $S_{i,t} = \alpha_t + \beta_t X_{i,t} + \beta_t \text{ESGtop}_{i,t} + \beta_t \text{ESGbottom}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$

	M1-ENV	M2-SOC	M3-CGV	M4-ESG		M1-ENV	M2-SOC	M3-CGV	M4-ESG
Intercept	-165.55	-167.99	-160.06	-177.67	<i>ESG variables</i>				
	<b>(-8.39)</b>	<b>(-8.8)</b>	<b>(-8.28)</b>	<b>(-8.21)</b>	ENV top	4.32			0.19
Rat D <sup>2</sup>	-10.27	-13.34	-8.00	-10.42		(.65)			(.02)
	(-1.19)	(-1.31)	(-.99)	(-1.21)	ENV bottom	25.77			28.43
Rat D <sup>3</sup>	4.85	12.91	10.19	10.94		<b>(3.18)</b>			<b>(3.58)</b>
	(.61)	<b>(1.84)</b>	<b>(1.7)</b>	(1.58)	SOC top		22.47		24.06
Rat D <sup>4</sup>	9.61	18.73	15.67	17.28			<b>(4.77)</b>		<b>(4.58)</b>
	(1.48)	<b>(2.77)</b>	<b>(2.96)</b>	<b>(2.51)</b>	SOC bottom		1.96		-6.11
Rat D <sup>5</sup>	104.65	115.85	111.32	115.82			(.21)		(-.7)
	<b>(4.78)</b>	<b>(5.24)</b>	<b>(5.57)</b>	<b>(4.77)</b>	CGV top			8.34	8.82
Vol	113.01	115.00	111.89	112.61				(1.46)	(1.61)
	<b>(5.91)</b>	<b>(6.38)</b>	<b>(5.92)</b>	<b>(6.05)</b>	CGV bottom			7.51	7.34
Ret	-0.64	-0.67	-0.61	-0.65				(1.07)	(1.24)
	(-1.4)	(-1.48)	(-1.43)	(-1.47)	N	8,287	8,287	8,287	8,287
Lev	1.73	1.58	1.63	1.67	Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.7567	0.7576	0.7549	0.7568
	<b>(2.32)</b>	<b>(2.43)</b>	<b>(2.25)</b>	<b>(2.28)</b>					

- Firms in **worst ENV quartile** show **28bp higher spreads** compared to average firms → **Risk-mitigation**
- Firms in **best SOC quartile** show **24bp higher spreads** compared to average firms → **Overinvestment**

## Materiality of E- and S-category scores in Fama-MacBeth regressions


- For each  $t$ :  $S_{i,t} = \alpha_t + \beta_t X_{i,t} + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_{t,k} \text{ESG\_cat\_top}_{i,t,k} + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_{t,k} \text{ESG\_cat\_bot}_{i,t,k} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$

<i>ENV Categories</i>	M5	M6	M7	M8
<b>Resource Use top</b>	-11.44 (-1.27)			-13.14 (-1.47)
<b>Resource Use bot</b>	-1.18 (-.18)			1.78 (.32)
<b>Emissions top</b>		-9.86 <b>(-2.34)</b>		-6.78 (-1.58)
<b>Emissions bot</b>		-8.56 (-1.27)		-13.33 <b>(-1.96)</b>
<b>Innovation top</b>			-2.16 (-.37)	-0.65 (-.11)
<b>Innovation bot</b>			25.79 <b>(2.37)</b>	31.54 <b>(2.86)</b>
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.7560	0.7559	0.7592	0.7576

<i>SOC Categories</i>	M9	M10	M11	M12	M13
<b>Workforce top</b>	-0.91 (-.16)				-2.83 (-.4)
<b>Workforce bot</b>	8.42 (1.04)				7.13 (.87)
<b>Human Rights top</b>		21.51 <b>(3.33)</b>			21.59 <b>(3.48)</b>
<b>Human Rights bot</b>		7.73 (1.07)			11.96 (1.41)
<b>Community top</b>			2.56 (.57)		1.57 (.38)
<b>Community bot</b>			-15.96 (-1.37)		-16.32 (-1.32)
<b>Product Resp. top</b>					17.40 <b>(4.17)</b>
<b>Product Resp. bot</b>					-13.10 (-1.4)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.7544	0.7574	0.7611		0.7592

- Higher spreads for lower ENV firms driven by **Innovation Score**
- Higher spreads for higher SOC firms driven by **Product Responsibility** and **Humans Rights Scores**

## Did the Eurozone crisis in 2011 affect markets' sustainability awareness?



## Subperiods – Fama-MacBeth regressions with ESG dummy variables

### 07/2009-05/2011

	M1-ENV	M2-SOC	M3-CGV	M4-ESG
Vol	92.07 <b>(5.62)</b>	98.01 <b>(6.03)</b>	91.14 <b>(5.44)</b>	92.42 <b>(5.)</b>
Ret	-0.47 <b>(-1.92)</b>	-0.51 <b>(-2.07)</b>	-0.42 <b>(-1.58)</b>	-0.56 <b>(-2.21)</b>
Lev	2.74 <b>(6.27)</b>	2.36 <b>(5.45)</b>	2.52 <b>(7.27)</b>	2.62 <b>(5.88)</b>
ENV top	29.08 <b>(2.96)</b>			29.19 <b>(2.86)</b>
ENV bot	35.56 <b>(6.19)</b>			33.33 <b>(10.59)</b>
SOC top		35.51 <b>(1.55)</b>		34.65 <b>(1.75)</b>
SOC bot		17.51 <b>(1.59)</b>		14.54 <b>(1.37)</b>
CGV top			12.48 <b>(2.96)</b>	16.64 <b>(4.69)</b>
CGV bot			1.87 <b>(.17)</b>	3.04 <b>(.31)</b>
N	1,941	1,941	1,941	1,941
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.7814	0.7846	0.7795	0.7849

### 03/2012-12/2016

	M1-ENV	M2-SOC	M3-CGV	M4-ESG
Vol	126.40 <b>(3.98)</b>	125.91 <b>(3.9)</b>	125.01 <b>(4.05)</b>	125.39 <b>(4.08)</b>
Ret	0.01 <b>(.03)</b>	-0.02 <b>(-.06)</b>	-0.02 <b>(-.06)</b>	0.00 <b>(-.01)</b>
Lev	0.90 <b>(3.2)</b>	0.88 <b>(3.19)</b>	0.86 <b>(3.03)</b>	0.84 <b>(3.23)</b>
ENV top	-7.14 <b>(-2.49)</b>			-13.16 <b>(-4.17)</b>
ENV bot	17.47 <b>(1.45)</b>			21.15 <b>(2.11)</b>
SOC top		18.95 <b>(5.88)</b>		21.61 <b>(5.39)</b>
SOC bot		-0.47 <b>(-.03)</b>		-10.43 <b>(-.84)</b>
CGV top			5.38 <b>(.89)</b>	8.20 <b>(1.24)</b>
CGV bot			13.69 <b>(1.7)</b>	12.54 <b>(1.96)</b>
N	5,541	5,541	5,541	5,541
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.7463	0.7469	0.7444	0.7449

Differences in results between subperiods point to time-varying market valuation of ESG

## Research questions and contribution

### 1. Is ESG a determinant of credit spreads in the cross-section of firms?

- Apply ESG ratings to explain credit spreads → Fama-MacBeth regressions
- Consideration of subperiods and potential non-linearities (Barnett & Salomon, 2006; Lee et al., 2010; Mama et al., 2017)


### 2. Is the time-varying market valuation of ESG a determinant of CDS spread changes?

- Fama and French-style ESG factors to capture time-varying market valuation of ESG impact on credit risk
- Time-series regressions of spread changes explained by ESG factors and controls

## Construction of ESG factors following Fama/French (1993, 2015)

- **ENV-factor related to environmental pillar:**

1. Assignment of firms to six equal-weighted portfolios (monthly update and rebalancing):




2. Calculate ENV factor as returns on long-short portfolio, long in low ENV and short in high ENV firms:

$$ENV_t = 0,5(HH_t + LH_t) - 0,5(HL_t + LL_t)$$

- **$SOC_t$  and  $CGV_t$  = factors related to social and governance**

## Cumulative ESG factors over time



ESG factors are intended to cover market valuation of market-perceived ESG impact on credit risks over time

## Time-series analysis – ENV factor explaining spread changes

- Two estimations for each firm  $i$

$$\mathbf{4F-M:} \quad \Delta S_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i^{RET} RET_{i,t} + \beta_i^{VOL} \Delta VOL_{i,t} + \beta_i^{HML} HML_t + \beta_i^{MRI} \Delta MRI_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

$$\mathbf{5F-ENV:} \quad \Delta S_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i^{RET} RET_{i,t} + \beta_i^{VOL} \Delta VOL_{i,t} + \beta_i^{HML} HML_t + \beta_i^{MRI} \Delta MRI_{i,t} + \boxed{\beta_i^{ENV} \Delta ENV_t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

- Sort firms into quintiles based on their exposures to the ENV factor  $\beta_i^{ENV}$
- Calculate average changes in  $R^2$  between 4F-M and 5F-ESG indicate **explanatory power of time-varying market-perception of ESG** regarding **changes in credit spreads**



## Time-series regressions: Portfolio descriptives and results on ENV factor

	Q1 (low exp.)	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5 (high exp.)
	ENV exposure quintiles				
MRI	0,51 <b>(5,22)</b>	0,53 <b>(21,91)</b>	0,64 <b>(7,59)</b>	0,44 <b>(9,25)</b>	1,05 <b>(12,32)</b>
adj. R2 (without ENV, %)	42,69	50,31	47,00	45,97	48,80
MRI	0,56 <b>(7,45)</b>	0,53 <b>(21,93)</b>	0,63 <b>(7,61)</b>	0,46 <b>(9,71)</b>	1,15 <b>(11,73)</b>
ENV	-0,44 <b>(-2,44)</b>	0,01 <b>(4,7)</b>	0,07 <b>(26,01)</b>	0,17 <b>(20,48)</b>	0,64 <b>(7,54)</b>
adj. R2 (with ENV, %)	44,00	49,86	47,71	48,18	53,80
<b>chg adj. R2</b>	<b>1,32***</b>	-0,46	<b>0,71*</b>	<b>2,21***</b>	<b>5,00***</b>

- **Significant increases in R<sup>2</sup>** → ENV factor adds explanatory power regarding changes in credit spreads
- **Green** firms (Q5) exhibit **decreases** in spreads that **cannot** be explained by common factors
- Rather: ENV factor explains decreases → consistent with markets' rising awareness of environmental risks

## Summary

### 1. Is ESG a determinant of credit spreads in the cross-section of firms?

- **Yes**
- **28bp** higher spreads for firms with **lowest E-rating** → **Risk-mitigation** → environmental innovation capacity
- **24bp** higher spreads for firms with **highest S-rating** → **Overinvestment** → Human Rights + Product Responsibility

### 2. Is the time-varying market valuation of ESG a determinant of CDS spread changes?

- **Yes**
- **ESG factors** intend to cover market valuation of market-perceived ESG impact on credit risks over time
- ENV factor **increases explanatory power** of standard models explaining credit spread changes pointing to **some credit spread variation** being **driven by time-varying market valuation of ENV risks**

## Outlook

- **Update of data (ongoing):** Markit CDS spreads (available from 2002) and MSCI ESG ratings
- **Term structure and slope of credit curve?**
- **Impact of ECB's QE program?** Robust results when leaving out 04/2016+
- **ESG as indicator for future changes of credit risk?** Changes in ESG to explain subsequent changes in credit spreads
- **Which components of spreads are affected by ESG?** Credit, liquidity or both components of CDS spreads?