European Commission

Conceptualizations of socio-economic status and preferences for redistribution

JRC Working Papers Series on
Social Classes in the Digital Age
2023/02

Antonio M. Jaime-Castillo,
Juan J. Fernandez

Joint
Research
Centre

This Working Paper is part of a Working paper series on Social Classes in the Digital Age by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) The JRC is the European Commission's science and knowledge service. It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use that might be made of this publication. The Working paper series on Social Classes in the Digital Age is intended to give visibility to early stage research to stimulate debate, incorporate feedback and engage into further developments of the research. This Working Paper is subject to the Commission Reuse Decision which allows authors to reuse the material without the need of an individual application.

Contact information
Name: Antonio M. Jaime-Castillo
Address: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia
Contacto: amjaime@poli.uned.es

EU Science Hub
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc

https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research/centre-advanced-studies/digclass

JRC131510

Seville: European Commission, 2023

How to cite this report: Jaime-Castillo, A. M., Fernandez, J. J., *Conceptualizations of socio-economic status and preferences for redistribution*, European Commission, Seville, 2023, JRC131510.

Contents

Conceptualizations of socio-economic status and preferences for redistribution

Antonio M. Jaime-Castillo (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia), Juan J. Fernandez (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

Abstract

The self-interest approach to preferences for redistribution draws upon the idea that socio-economic conditions influence policy preferences via personal interests. Following this principle, a burgeoning interdisciplinary literature has examined the influence of socio- economic status (SES) on redistributive preferences. Yet this body of research is quite fragmented because it includes a plethora of understandings of SES and there is still no consensus on which conceptualization best accounts for variation in these preferences. We fill this gap in the literature through an analysis of the predictive validity of seven conceptualizations of SES: (i) income as a linear measure; (ii) income measured in deciles; (iii) skills specificity; (iv) ESeC schema; (v) Kitchelt-Rehm's class schema; (vi) risk of unemployment; and (vii) routine task intensity. Using data from the European Social Survey for 24 countries in 2012-2018, we determine the predictive validity of each conceptualization through measures of goodness of fit that prove sensitive to explanatory power and parsimony of the models. The results show that linear income constitutes the conceptualization with highest predictive validity in 14 of the 24 countries. The approaches of the risk of unemployment and skills specificity display lower validity than income but higher than that of the ESeC, Oesch and Kitchelt-Rehm class schemas.

Authors: Antonio M. Jaime-Castillo (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia), Juan J. Fernandez (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

Joint Research Centre reference number: JRC131510

Related publications and reports:

Oesch, D., *Contemporary Class Analysis*, European Commission, Seville, 2022, JRC126506 https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/publications/contemporary-class-analysis_es

Muñoz de Bustillo Llorente, R., Esteve Mora, F., *Social classes in economic analysis. A brief historical account*, European Commission, Seville, 2022, JRC127236 https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-03/JRC127236.pdf

Passaretta, G., Gil-Hernández, C. J., *The early root of the digital divide: Socioeconomic inequality in children's ICT literacy from primary to secondary schooling*, European Commission, Seville, 2022, JRC128931 https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-06/JRC128931.pdf

Gil-Hernández, C. J., Vidal Lorda, G., Torrejón Pérez, S., *Technology, Tasks and Social Classes in Europe*, European Commission, Seville, 2022, JRC129522 https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/document/download/cbd9a9a4-e6cd-46e1-9453-60748359814c_en?filename=JRC129522.pdf

Fana, M., Villani, D., *Reconsidering social classes and functional income distribution in the 21st century. A theoretical and empirical assessment*, European Commission, Seville, 2022, JRC128667 https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-06/JRC128667.pdf

Esteve Mora, F. Muñoz de Bustillo Llorente, R. *The economics of class. A dual approach*, European Commission, Seville, 2022, JRC129746 https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/publications/economics-class-dual-approach_en

Fana, M., Villani, D., *Is it all the same? Types of innovation and their relationship with direct control, technical control and algorithmic management across European firms*, Seville: European Commission, 2022/07, JRC130064 https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/publications/it-all-same-types-innovation-and-their-relationship-direct-control-technical-control-and-algorithmic_en

1 Introduction

Scholarly research on socio-economic divides in redistribution preferences is both burgeoning and fragmented. Over the last decades many studies in the social sciences have examined attitudes towards the role of the state in economic redistribution, an interest in part stemming from income inequality trends in high-income democracies. Whether measured in terms of income ratios, income concentrated by certain groups or general measures like the Gini index, disparities in economic standing have generally grown in Western societies over the last three decades (Chancel and Zucman 2022; Dabla-Norris et al. 2015; Piketty 2018). Seeking to determine the responsiveness of public opinion to these trends, an interdisciplinary literature has emerged on popular support for state-driven redistribution. This emerging literature provides nuanced insights on general patterns of support for redistribution (Breznau and Hommerich 2019) and country conditions that shape these preferences (e.g. Dallinger 2010; Mosimann and Pontusson 2022; Schmidt-Catran 2016).

Extensive research has also examined micro-level divides in redistribution preferences. Most works draw on the tenet that objective socio-economic conditions influence policy preferences via personal interests (Kumlin 2007; Lindh and McCall 2020; Manza and Crowley 2018). Yet there is still no consensus on conceptualizations of SES providing more analytical leverage. Indeed in this deeply interdisciplinary literature many conceptualizations of socio-economic standing have been linked to redistribution preferences (McCall and Manza 2011). Extant studies on these preferences conceptualize and operationalize socio-economic location in terms of income (Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Beramendi and Rehm 2016), large occupational groups linked to employment relations (Fernández and Jaime-Castillo 2018) or work logics (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014), levels of skills specificity (Iversen and Soskice 2001), risks of unemployment (Rehm 2009, 2011), routine task intensity (Thewissen and Rueda 2019), occupation offshorability (Walter 2017) and even specific occupations (Weeden and Grusky 2012).[1]

In themselves, these analyses shed light on our understanding of which socio-economic groups prove more committed towards redistribution. Yet in seeking to advance (yet another) politically-relevant conceptualization of SES, these studies display three main limitations. First, many of them talk past each other. They commonly control for just one alternative conceptualization and rarely consider most or (at least several) alternative conceptualizations – especially those generated in other disciplines. As a result, the robustness of effects associated with most factors remains under-documented. Second, most studies advancing new conceptualizations pool data for several countries and do not explore potential cross-national heterogeneity in the predictive role of their advocated indicator, although attitudinal salience of divides may differ from country to country. Third, extant studies uniformly discount costs of additional model complexity. The standard strategy of these studies involves assessing solely whether the variable(s) tapping the proposed conceptualization has(have) a significant and/or substantial impact after controlling for a range of conditions independent from model complexity.[2] This approach thus ignores the role of parsimony.

This large degree of fragmentation in scholarly production on pro-redistribution divides – partially driven by increasing insularity of social scientific debates –, means that there are no comprehensive studies addressing the critical matter of which conceptualization of SES constitutes the most efficient predictor of redistribution attitudes. In other words, we do not yet know which SES conceptualization provides the

[1] Despite the fact that a specific conceptualization could lead to multiple operationalizations, in previous work these seven conceptualizations have one main operationalization. In the following discussion we, thus, use the terms conceptualization and operationalization interchangeably.

[2] Weeden and Grusky (2012) provides an exception for the second and third limitations.

best balance between parsimony and explanatory power. This manuscript seeks to fill the gap. It follows an eclectic and agnostic approach to determine the predictive validity – also called construct validity – of seven major conceptualizations of SES for redistribution preferences. Within this general goal, we tackle two concrete questions: First, which conceptualization provides the best trade-off between explanatory power and parsimony? Second, which conceptualization has the most stable effect after controlling for the other alternatives?

We seek to answer these two questions without preconceptions. Being theoretically unbound to any of the theories underlying these conceptualizations, our aim in this study is to identify the predictive validity of these indicators in comparative terms. We specifically focus on seven conceptualizations with especially large recognition in the social sciences: (i) net income in linear terms (Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Beramendi and Rehm 2016); (ii) a set of dummy variables for household's income decile (Guillaud 2013); (iii) the degree of skills specificity (Iversen and Soskice 2001); (iv) the European Socio-economic Classification (ESeC) (Paskov and Weisstanner 2022); (v) the class typology devised by Oesch (2006) and revised by Kitschelt and Rehm (2014);

(vi) the risk of unemployment (Rehm 2009, 2011); and (vii) task routine intensity (Thewissen and Rueda 2019). A few studies compare the predictive power of SES conceptualizations (Carriero 2021; Kevins et al. 2019; McCall and Manza 2011; Weeden and Grusky 2012), however they all only consider two SES alternatives and none but one (Kevins et al. 2019) assess their predictive power across a variety of European countries.

To assess the predictive validity of each of these seven conceptualizations, we conduct multivariate analyses of the determinants of redistribution preferences in 24 European countries during 2012-2018. We specifically utilize rounds six to nine of the European Social Survey (ESS) (2012-2018) - which is a high-quality and representative data source of the living conditions and attitudes of Europeans. To give a fair chance of all seven conceptualizations, we go to great lengths to correctly implement the operationalization utilized in key publications ad- vocating each indicator. In the following analysis, we determine the predictive validity of each indicator by taking into account both the explanatory power and parsimony of the models. For this purpose, we specifically conduct comparisons of statistical goodness of fit – especially, but not only the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) – across models including each of the conceptualizations (Raftery 1995). As the predictive validity of SES indicators may be heterogeneous across countries, we disaggregate the analysis by country.

The results show that overall income-based models better fit the data than the rest of the models in most of the countries. On the other hand, class based conceptualizations, such as ESeC or the typology proposed by Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) do worse than other approaches, such as the risk of unemployment and skill specificity. The paper is structured as follows. In the following section we present the conceptualizations of SES and the main findings of the literature on preferences for redistribution based on these conceptualizations. We then describe our data sources and analytical strategy. The next section is devoted to present our main findings. The final section summarizes the conclusions and discusses the theoretical implications.

2 Conceptualizations of Socio-economic Status and Redistribution Preferences

A central theme in the interdisciplinary literature on redistribution preferences revolves around the role of socio-economic divides. Many works in this area assess whether objectively-defined, socio-economic locations of individuals affect their redistribution preferences. Despite extensive differences in the theoretical models underpinning their claims and their ultimate predictions

- which we review briefly below -, studies in this area share a commitment to rational-action assumptions (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Roberts 1977). They build on the tenets that (a) objective socio-economic locations determine personal economic interests and (b) that these self-interests determine political preferences. The self-interest approach is certainly not the only model of political attitude formation - in recent decades it has been challenged by a growing scholarship on other-regardingness (Bowles and Gintis 2011; Dimick, Rueda and Stegmueller 2018; Fong 2001). Yet the self-interest model remains clearly prevalent in the literature on pro-redistribution divides, to a large extent because extensive research using very diverse operationalizations and indicators reports robust associations between indicators of individual SES and redistribution preferences (Kumlin 2007).

Research on political preferences following the self-interest approach towards redistribution preferences is, moreover, characterized by mounting conceptualization diversity and disciplinary insularity. Until the 2000s a sharp divide existed between an 'economic camp' of studies conceptualizing SES in terms of individual income and a 'sociological camp' of studies conceptualizing it in terms of large occupational groups (Evans and Carl 2017). Since the early 2000s this fragmentation has only expanded as, first, multiple political scientists have proposed new conceptualizations and, second, the sociological camp has further splintered between supporters of the Eriksson-Goldthorpe-Portocarrero (EGP), ESeC, Oesch and other models (Christoph, Matthes and Ebner 2020). The result is a scholarship with an heterogeneous array of SES models. The scholarly discussion is, furthermore, commonly sectionalized by discipline: economists, political scientists and sociologists usually contrast their conceptualization mostly against the others available in their field and discount those in other fields. For instance, major studies in economics do not assess the role of social class as defined by sociologists (Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Benabou and Ok 2001) and sociological work does not assess the role of skills specificity (Brady and Bostic 2015; Owens and Pedulla 2014).

Seven conceptualizations of SES have proven to have particularly large resonance in accounting for redistribution preferences: (i) a continuous linear measure of income; (ii) a set of dummy variables for household's income decile; (iii) the degree of skills specificity; (iv) the ESeC schema; (v) the Oesch class schema and versions of it; (vi) the risk of unemployment; and (vii) the routine task intensity. Seminal studies leveraging each of these conceptualizations can boast large number of citations in the social sciences.[3] What are the main similarities and differences across these seven conceptualizations? Seeking to systematize the presentation of these SES indicators, Table 1 classifies them along two axes: depending on (a) the number of considered aspects and (b) the range of voices using the conceptualization. Several studies have sought to capture a single dimension of occupational or economic reality, whereas other studies seek to capture multiple dimensions. Furthermore, the conceptualization may be a category of social thought and organization widely utilized by laypeople or one that has still not been popularized and restricted to academic circles. Combining the two dimensions, we can classify the seven SES conceptualizations. Two conceptualizations are uni-dimensional and widespread in common parlance: linear income and income groups. Three other conceptualizations are uni-dimensional and restricted to academic use: skills specificity, the unemployment risk and task repetition intensity. Two further conceptualizations are multidimensional and restricted to academic use: ESeC and the Oesch schema.

[3] In May 2022 Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Iversen and Soskice (2001), Kitschelt and Rehm (2014), Rehm (2009), Thewissen and Rueda (2019) already, respectively, had 545, 461, 116, 241, and 29 citations in the Web of Science.

Table 1: Classification of socio-economic conceptualizations based on three dimensions

		Aspects considered by the conceptualization	
		One dimension	Multiple dimension
Use in the public sphere	Common use by laypeople	Linear income Income groups	
	Academic construct	Uneployment risk Skills specificity Task repetition	ESeC Kitschelt-Rehm Schema

Individual or household *income* has for long been a central objective economic dimension affecting political attitudes (especially in the fields of economy and political science). It is even the most common indicator in the sociology of stratification (Barone, Hertel and Smallenbroek 2021) and "the most common strategy for operationalizing the class location of individuals" in studies on political attitudes" (Manza and Crowley 2018: 370). Income offers a popular operationalization as this single dimension discriminates well among relative locations in the socio-economic hierarchy and people care deeply about their purchasing power vis-a-vis that of their compatriots. From this perspective, since individuals in the lowest half of the income distribution have lower resources than individuals in the highest half, they have more to gain from state-driven redistribution and are disproportionately likely to support redistributive policies (Lipset 1960; Meltzer and Richard 1981; Roberts 1977). Despite the simplicity of this model, it has proven productive: whether measured in linear terms or in ordinal categorical levels, a long list of studies in economics (Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Guillaud 2013), political science (Doherty, Gerber and Green 2006; Roller 1995; Walter 2017) and sociology (Brady and Bostic 2015; Owens and Pedulla 2014) report direct and positive associations between individual (and household) income and redistribution preferences.

Three one-dimensional and continuous conceptualizations of SES have been proposed since the early 2000s. Formulated by political scientists and political economists, they identify axes of objective socio-economic differentiation around occupational features, which are theorized as consequential for political preference formation. The three models have not been suggested as substitutive, but as complementary to the income dimension. They refer to the *skills specificity* (Iversen and Soskice 2001), *unemployment risk* (Rehm 2009, 2011) and *task routine intensity* (Thewissen and Rueda 2019) of occupations. The three models, moreover, build on the principle that redistribution constitutes a form of individual insurance against potentially substantial drops in income during the life cycle due to ill health, job loss or old age. Iversen and Soskice (2001) broke new ground in the self-interest approach by theorizing that beyond the amount of human capital, the asset or *skills specificity* of human capital is also politically consequential. Many occupations are filled with workers with specific skills whereas others comprise workers with general, portable skills. This approach argues that in the face of wage or employment loss, workers in occupations with high skills specificity have a smaller range of jobs they can transfer into and thus suffer higher risks of large declines in their purchasing power, which incentivizes them to be disproportionately supportive of redistribution. Operationalizing this as the inverse of the proportion of workers per occupation, Iversen and Soskice (2001) and latter studies have documented a positive effect of skills specificity (Cusack, Iversen and Rehm 2006; Gelepithis and Giani 2022) on redistribution preferences. Rehm (2009; 2011) has alternatively argued for the attitudinal relevance of variations in *unemployment risks* across

occupations.[4] He argues that in post-industrial societies, the largest individual risk is that of job loss, so that individuals at higher risk of unemployment support pro-redistributive policies to prevent sharp income losses. In determining their risk of unemployment, Rehm's model states that the prevalent reference of comparison used by individuals is their occupation, because their own human capital is tied to their occupation - rather than their economic sector - and because occupations are major sites of normative and political socialization. Rehm's general prediction that occupational-specific risks of unemployment shape redistributive preferences has been supported by his and latter empirical work (Rehm 2016; Vlandas 2021). More recently, Thewissen and Rueda (2019) have argued for a third occupational-based continuous divide which may have an attitudinal impact: *routine task intensity*. According to their model, since technological change and work automation crowds-out routine occupations with intermediary skills, individuals in occupations susceptible to automation are more supportive of redistribution (Busemeyer and Sahm 2021). Importantly, these two latter models consider that unemployment and automation risk are orthogonal to skills specificity, because occupations with high skill specificity vary widely in unemployment risks and routine task intensity.

The *ESeC* and *Oesch* conceptualizations of SES fall into the bottom right-quadrant of Table 1 as they constitute strict academic constructs leading to categories of classification rarely used by laypeople. They also represent multicategorical conceptualizations capturing multiple dimensions of individual socio-economic standing. Both indicators have a strong sociological outlook. Designed as an improvement of the classic EGP class schema (Goldthorpe 2000), the ESeC schema classifies workers into 8-10 groups depending on combinations of their working conditions and the reward package offered by employers to meet firm needs (Rose and Harrison 2010). Taking the two classes in extreme positions, individuals in the upper salariat class fill jobs requiring task autonomy and skills in high demand, whereas individuals in the working class fill jobs with low autonomy and general skills. To ensure retention of the former, they are compensated with higher income, job security and promotion prospects. These differentials in economic conditions, the model goes, produce divides in life chances (Weber 2019) and political interests (Evans and Carl 2017). Recent studies relying on ESeC to predict redistribution preferences show that (controlling for individual income) unskilled workers are significantly more supportive of redistribution than all the other classes (Paskov and Weisstanner 2022, also Jordan 2014).

Derived from Oesch's (2006) class schema, the *Kitschelt-Rehm* schema classifies workers into large occupational groups based on the skills brought by workers to the labour market. It differs from the EGP and ESeC schemas in its reliance on a second dimension concerning the type of tasks commonly conducted by that large occupational group. It specifically identifies three logics (in contrast to the four of the Oesch's schema) of task structure: interpersonal, organizational and technical. Regarding redistribution preferences, Kitschelt and Rehm (2014, Kitschelt et al. 1994) specifically hypothesize that daily working routines in the interpersonal logic are characterized by recurring symbolic interaction and one-to-one negotiations, which induces workers in this logic to hold more compassion, egalitarian ethos and ultimately more support for redistribution than workers in other logics (also, Kriesi et al. 2008). Furthermore, Kitschelt and Rehm (1994) show that unskilled workers and workers in interpersonal logic actually prove more supportive of redistribution (also, Häusermann and Kriesi 2015).

A few recent studies have begun comparative exploration of the predictive power of conceptualizations of SES on political attitudes. Using US data, McCall and Manza (2011) and Weeden and Grusky (2012) assess the predictive power of, on the one hand, the EGP model versus, on the other, income and micro-classes, respectively. In both cases, the EGP schema fares worse than the alternative. Using data for European countries, Kevins et al. (2019) examines the predictive power of subjective social class versus income and find that income is a better predictor of attitudes towards the welfare state. Carriero (2021),

[4] A similar model but developed at the macro-level is developed by Moene and Wallerstein (2003).

instead, relies on ESS data to assess the predictive power of the ESeC versus the Oesch schema on redistribution attitudes and concludes that their predictive validity are practically indistinguishable. These latter comparative studies provide valuable insights but they have limitations because (a) they limit the comparison to only two conceptualizations - when at least seven exist -, (b) do not explore cross-national variations in the predictive power of each indicator, and (c) usually do not explorethe parsimony of explanatory models[5].

3 Advantages and disadvantages of the seven conceptualizations of SES

The objective of this study is preeminently empirical: determining which of the seven indicators of SES has the greatest predictive power. However, a conceptual discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each indicators provides helpful guidance for the interpretation of the results. In this section we thus briefly address the pros and cons of each indicator. Since recent conceptual reviews only explore a few of these indicators (Lindh and McCall 2020; Manza and Crowley 2018) and studies on the construct and criterion validity remain limited to few conceptualizations, the following arguments are necessarily restricted. In abstract terms, a conceptualization of SES has the strongest potential to account for redistribution preferences if it (a) captures a substantial degree of variation in objective economic differences, (b) is used as a category of thought and organization by laypeople, (c) generates in-group collective identity, and (d) induces direct and preeminent interests in economic redistribution. How do the seven conceptualizations fair on each of these aspects? The following paragraphs - summarized in Table 2 - provide indications on this matter.

Conceptualizing SES in terms of sheer income has relevant advantages in that it constitutes a culturally-preeminent category of classification (rich/poor, high/middle/low income) and hence common measuring tool individuals use to establish of relative position. It also has an unmediated, evident connection with personal interests in economic redistribution. Low-income individuals have a direct interest in progressive redistribution while high-income individuals do not. As disadvantage, income variables tend to produce a comparatively larger proportion of missings values, which hamper external validity. There is also evidence that citizens in Europe have difficulties identifying their relative position on the income distribution scale (Engelhardt and Wagener 2018).

Models of SES based on large occupational groups such as the ESeC and Oesch's (2006) schema as revised by Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) have a major advantage in that, by design, they are multidimensional and capture a broad range of existing labour-market-related inequalities -e.g. income, job security, job autonomy, promotion opportunities - all of which shape personal gains from state-driven redistribution (Goldthorpe 2000). The two categorical approaches also benefit from high criterion validity: multiple social stratification studies document that they measure existing variations in employment relations and reward packages across classes (Rose and Harrison 2010; Wirth et al. 2009). Yet they have predictive limitations. The advantage of defining few (8-10) groups in both schemas comes at the cost of producing non-negligible variation within each category. ESeC higher-grade white-collar and higher-grade blue-collar classes, for instance, do not differ significantly in their employment relations (Smallenbroek, Hertel and Barone 2021). In addition, the Kitschelt-Rehm model actually predicts small differences in redistribution preferences across work logics, which means that the discriminatory power of this operationalization may be limited.

[5] McCall and Manza (2011) is an exception

Table 2: Advantages and disadvantages of each of the seven SES conceptualizations as predictors of redistribution preferences

	Arguments for large predictive power	Arguments for limited predictive power
Income/Deciles	Unmediated, explicit connectionwith economic redistribution High/low income are common categories used by citizens	Large number of missings People have difficulties identifying their income position
ESeC	It captures objective differences in reward packages and working conditions Extensively validated by empirical research on stratification and political preferences	Large heterogeneity within each category Heterogeneity of effects may reduce the salience of redistribution and dilute that effect
Kitschelt/Rehm	It differentiates between two levels of authority with clearly differentiated economic interests	Large heterogeneity within each category The model does not actually expect large differences across work logics due to socio-cult professionals
Unemployment risk	Subjectively-defined concern over job loss and persistent unemployment is widespread	The most direct self-interest lies in job protection and top-down income redistribution is subsidiary -It assumes non-residual structural unemployment
RTI	Workers have incentives to monitor the routinization of their occupation	Subjective concern over automatization does not directly affect support for social protection
Skills specificity	Skills specificity is positively related to subjective difficulties of finding a job	Replaceability and portability of specific skills depends substantively on labour market conditions

The three remaining conceptualizations (unemployment risks, skills specificity and routien task intensity (RTI) share the advantage of large discriminatory capacity. By virtue of using a continuous indicator they can capture substantial variation in objective occupational conditions. More specifically, the skills specificity operationalization has the desirable property that there is evidence supporting a core mechanism of the model: workers with more skills specificity are actually more likely to perceive that they would have difficulties finding another job (Iversen and Soskice 2001). However, the interest produced by skills specificity actually proves rather sensitive to contextual conditions. The across-job portability of highly-specific skills is, indeed, high in certain economies, ultimately making workers with those skills disproportionately *less* likely to support redistribution (Christenko, Martinaitis and Gaušas 2020).

A major advantage of the unemployment risk as a measurement of SES is that it reflects an issue that is salient for workers in many European countries (Mau, Mewes and Schöneck 2012). This dimension, however, has the limitation of a non-direct link with economic redistribution. Workers with a high objective risk of unemployment have the largest, direct political self-interest in job-protection legislation; their interest in fiscal/welfare redistributive programmes is sub-

sidiary. Moreover, in contexts of very low unemployment rates, this indicator may have weak explanatory power. The last indicator - RTI - has the desirable property that workers can easily evaluate the routinization of their occupation. However, it faces the drawback of low construct validity, because subjective concern of automatization is not actually significantly related to support for social protection (Gallego et al. 2022). Recent studies, moreover, only provide mixed evidence of an effect of automatization risk on redistribution preferences (Gallego and Kurer 2022).

4 Data and methods

Since our goal is to compare the predictive validity of each conceptualization of SES in explaining preferences for redistribution among Europeans, we rely on the European Social Survey (ESS), which contains information on all necessary variables to build each SES indicator and provides high-quality data. We specifically analyze rounds six to nine (2012-2018) of the ESS and assess patterns for 24 EU member states. We restrict our analysis to this period to facilitate data comparison and avoid the influence of breaks in the data series, since previous rounds of ESS either used a different scale to measure income - which are not commensurable with the last rounds - or only included data on the ISCO-88 rather than ISCO-08. Concerning the range of countries, seeking to maximize generability but maintaining countries with similar economic and political configurations, we include in the analysis all 23 EU member states included in recent ESS rounds plus the UK.[6] This amounts to a consolidated dataset of 24 countries, 104 country-years and 99,391 individuals. We include all available rounds for each of the countries considered, although there is variation in the sample size for each country. In addition, we restrict our analysis to the working age population (25-65 years) to avoid the distortion produced by young people who are still studying or do not have a permanent job and by retirees, who do not face risk of unemployment or skill specificity.[7]

Our dependent variable is preference for redistribution. It is measured as the agreement with the statement "The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels". Possible answers are "agree strongly", "agree", "neither agree nor disagree", "disagree", and "disagree strongly". For the main models we dichotomize this variable by merging categories "agree strongly", "agree" in one group (1) against the other categories (0), in order to ease computation and because the use of discrete choice models for ordinal outcomes, such as ordered logit or probit, relies on the parallel regression lines assumption, which is often violated. Several prior studies use this ESS questionnaire item successfully to capture the support for redistribution (e.g. Finseraas 2009; Rueda 2018). Robustness checks discussed below using the linear and ordinal transformations of this variable produced equivalent results.

[6] The countries included are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and UK.

[7] For categories based on ISCO-08, such as ESEC, we also excluded individuals for which information is only available at one-digit ISCO level and workers from group 0 (the military).

Our main explanatory variables are the conceptualizations of SES: income, social class, skill specificity, risk of unemployment and routine task intensity. To measure income we use two different approaches. First, we measure income as a categorical variable by employing the decile of the individual's household according to net income, using nine dummy variables for deciles 2 through 10 - with decile 1 as the reference category. Secondly, we measure income as the log of a linear estimate of actual income. For each respondent the actual household income is calculated as the mid-point interval of the decile to which the household belongs, with the lower and upper bounds of each decile taken from ESS fieldwork documents. Moreover, to account for differences in household size, we use an equivalized measure of income by dividing household income by the square root of household size. The first operationalization allows us to capture potentially non-linear effects of income groups and it measures the effect of the relative position of each individual within the income distribution. The second approach, in contrast, takes into account the absolute distance between individuals. These two variables are termed *deciles* and *income*. The *skill specificity* of respondents' occupations is measured following the technical indications provided by Iversen and Soskice (2001) and Cusak, Iversen and Rehmn (2006). Absolute skill specificity for a particular branch of occupations (two digits ISCO-08) measures the share of ISCO-08 codes (four digits) within this branch of occupations over its share of the labour force. Thus, a higher absolute skill specificity indicates that more detailed occupations are needed to describe the skills of fewer workers in the labour force. Relative skill specificity is then obtained by dividing the absolute skill specificity by the skill level.[8] Concerning the risk of unemployment in the analysis called *risks* -, we follow Rehm (2009) and measure it as the unemployment rate of each individual's occupation (ISCO-08 level 1). The unemployment rates by occupation and the share of the labor force by ISCO-08 group were obtained from the EU labour force surveys (Eurostat 2021). Reliance on EU labour force surveys produces very high quality indicators of skills specificity and the unemployment risk, because these surveys have much larger samples sizes that the ESS itself. To measure routine task intensity (*RTI*), we follow Goos, Manning and Salomons (2014), who rely on the work by Autor and Dorn (2013) and use the *Dictionary of Occupational Titles* (DOT) for occupation definitions.[9] RTI is the difference between the log of index of routine intensity of each occupation and the log of the sum of the indices of manual and abstract characteristics for this occupation. This measure is constant across countries and time, and it is available at two digits ISCO-88. Therefore, we translated our ISCO-08 codes into ICO-88 codes and then assign the RTI of each ISCO-88 two digits.[10]

As discussed above, we capture the role of social class understood as large occupational classes through two different schemas: The ESeC (Rose and Harrison 2010) and the classification proposed by Kitschelt and Rehm (2014), which is a simplified version of the schema previously proposed by Oesch (2006). The ESeC schema conventionally includes nine classes: "large employers and higher managers and professionals", "lower managers and professionals, and higher supervisors", "intermediate occupations", "small employers and self-employed (without agriculture)", "small employers and self-employed (agriculture)", "lower supervisors and technicians", "lower sales and service workers", "lower technical workers" and "routine

[8] According to Iversen and Soskice (2001), the skill level can be measured by either the skill level according to ISCO-08 classification or individual education level, which produces two different measures of relative skill specificity. Following Cusak, Iversen and Rehmn (2006), we use a composite indicator of skill specificity as the average of the two proposed measures of skill specificity.

[9] As noted by Thewissen and Rueda (2019), this amounts to using US data for European occupations but nobetter alternative is yet available and previous works on European occupations still rely on US data (e.g. Goos, Manning and Salomons 2014).

[10] RTI is not available for six groups at the two-digit ISCO-88 level and, therefore, workers from these groups have not been included in the analysis.

workers". We adopt this classification and include eight dummy variables corresponding to each of these social classes while keeping "large employers and higher managers and professionals" as the reference category. The Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) schema includes 12 classes: "technical experts", "tech-nicians", "skilled manual workers", "low-skilled manual workers", "higher-grade managers and administrators", "lower-grade managers and administrators", "skilled clerks", "unskilled clerks", "socio-cultural professionals", "socio-cultural semi-professionals", "skilled service workers" and "low-skilled service workers". We adopt this classification and include 11 dummy variables corresponding to each of these social classes while keeping "technical experts" as the reference category. All models include control variables for gender (dichotomous), education (3 categories: lower secondary or less; upper secondary and post-secondary; and college), age (25-34; 35-44; 45-54; and 55-65 years old) and survey year. The Appendix includes definitions of all variables and discusses details of their operationalization. Table A1 provides descriptive statistics of all dependent and independent variables. Tables A2-A30 report all the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Avergae Marginal Effects (AME) values discussed below.

Concerning our analytical strategy, since our dependent variable has been dichotomized, we estimate logit models for each country. For each country we present eight models below. The first model is called the *No SES* model as it is the baseline, it only includes the control variables (excluding any SES conceptualization): gender, age group, education level and year of the survey. The following successive models 2-8 include all the control variables and include successively variables corresponding to each of the seven SES conceptualizations: *income, income deciles, ESEC, Kitschelt, risk* of unemployment, *skill specificity* and *RTI*. For each of the 2-8 models we include one conceptualization at a time (excluding the other six) in order to compare the predictive power of the model including each conceptualization with the remaining models. After estimating the logit models for each country, we evaluate the predictive power of each conceptualization, by comparing the goodness of fit of each model. Our comparison of model fitness relies on information criteria that gives each model a certain score to rank all the models from the best to the worst (Claeskens and Hjort 2008). We follow a classic approach to model selection and compute the AIC and, especially, the BIC, following the definitions in Claeskens and Hjort (2008) and Raftery (1995). According to Raftery (1995) and Hollenbach and Montgomery (2020), the Bayesian approach is the appropriate method to follow for the purpose of comparing non-nested models, since the standard frequentist approach - i.e. the Wald test - only allows us to evaluate restrictions within larger models. The Bayesian approach combines the explanatory power of predictors and the parsimony of the model to select the most efficient model in terms of minimizing its deviance with respect to the data using the smallest number of parameters. Altough AIC and BIC show similar patterns in our models, throughout the text we focus on BIC values because, first, BIC penalizes more than AIC the inclusion of additional parameters, rewarding parsimony; and, second, because simulation studies conclude that BIC is superior to AIC at identifying the correct model (Raffalovich et al. 2008). Sensitivity analyses discussed below, however, show that the main results are not sensitive to reliance on BIC or AIC. Concerning the treatment of missing values, we estimate two sets of models. First, we estimate country-based logit models using casewise deletion of missing data. However, since BIC might be affected by differences in sample sizes, in a second step we reestimate those models using the same sample for each model, i.e. the sample with complete information that results from excluding cases with any missing information for any of the control variables and conceptualizations.

5 Results

We conduct the empirical analysis in six stages. First, we explore the association between each of the SES conceptualizations and redistribution preferences. If the conceptualizations do not have significant and substantial power, any remaining analyses would be unwarranted. Second, we compare the predictive

power of seven conceptualizations of SES. Third, given the preeminence of linear *income* in our results, we report a series of sensitivity analyses to assess the stability of the main patterns found in the analysis. Fourth, we assess whether the effect of the linear *income* variable is robust to the inclusion of the other indicators. Fifth, we address whether adding any of the other six operationalizations improve the predictive power of the income-based models. Finally, we consider whether using an alternative dependent variable might have an impact on our findings.

5.1 SES and redistribution preferences

We begin by reviewing the distribution of the dependent variable and describing its association with each of the SES conceptualizations. As is well-known, Europeans are generally supportive of redistribution. In the sample of this study, 73.9% of respondents agree or strongly agree with the idea that government should reduce income differences. That being said, there is a substantial degree of variation between countries. This percentage ranges from 38.4% in Denmark to 91.2% in Portugal. More importantly, the seven conceptualizations display a substantial association with this political preference. The evidence supports the prediction establishing a negative relationship between SES and support for redistribution. The effects of SES are also substantial. Focusing on income and Germany (the EU country with the largest population), the probabilities of supporting redistribution for individuals living in households with income two standard deviations above and below the country average are .59 and .89, respectively. Regarding the effect of ESeC, the probabilities for high managers/professionals and routine workers are .65 and.82, respectively. Turning to skill specificity, the probabilities at two standard deviations below and above the average are .68 and .78, respectively. The probabilities for workers in occupations at two standard deviations above and below the average in the level of routinization are .71 and .75, respectively. Similar patterns are visible regarding the Kitschelt-Rehm conceptualization and the risk of unemployment.

Even if different operationalizations of SES prove related to redistribution attitudes, their effects may not be substantial enough to compensate for the added complexity and parsimony loss produced by the inclusion of SES variables. It is thus helpful to explore the goodness of fit of models with and without each of the SES measurements. To answer, we can compare a baseline model without SES with each of the operationalizations. In Figures 1 and 2 we report the values of BIC obtained after each logit model in each country under analysis (raw values are also reported on Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix). Figure 1 includes values from models using casewise deletion of missing data, while Figure 2 includes values from models with complete information - i.e., including only the cases for which we have complete information on every independent variable. Based on Figure 1, the pattern is clear for the casewise deletion of the missings scenario: the baseline model without SES performs worse than any other model in each country. This is consistent with the previously outlined finding that SES is a relevant predictor of preferences for redistribution in most European countries. Using complete information (Figure 2), the baseline model without SES performs worse than all other models in 17 countries, but it performs better than all other models in seven countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Hungary, Italy, Latvia and Portugal. Therefore, different operationalizations of SES constitute good predictors of preferences for redistribution in most countries - 17 out of 24 - but not in all of them. This is the case even when using the threshold of 10 points to establish a strong preference for the model with the lowest BIC (Raftery 1995) (Table A3).

Figure 1: Fitness statistics of logit models predicting redistribution preferences in European countries - Casewise deletion, 2012-2018



Figure 2: Fitness statistics of logit models predicting redistribution preferences in European countries. Complete information, 2012-2018



5.2 Comparing the predictive power of the seven SES conceptualizations

Even if the seven conceptualizations prove generally associated with the outcome; which conceptualization fits the data better? To answer, we compare the BIC of the baseline model without SES with the BIC from models after including each operationalization successively. This comparison across conceptualizations is, moreover, obviously only applicable to the 17 countries in which SES predicts the outcome. Figure 2 highlights the clear patterns. First, there are substantial differences in goodness of fit across models. Second and more importantly, models based on income - measured either in categorical variables of income deciles or by linear income outperform the other five alternatives. Patterns are equivalent if we, instead, consider the AIC (see Tables A25 and A26 in the Appendix).

If we turn to the complete information approach, the pattern still holds. In general, differences in BIC between income-based models and the remaining models decrease, mostly because of the decrease in sample size (which increases BIC values). Moreover, there are now eight countries in which the income based model is not that which best fits the data. In six of them

Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Hungary, Italy, and Latvia - the baseline model provides the best fit. Regarding Portugal, the model based on the RTI score outperforms the baseline model, although the difference is negligible. In Lithuania BIC scores indicate a strong preference for *risk* of unemployment rather than linear income, since the difference between the former model and that of the baseline is greater than 10. However, most importantly, using the complete information approach, the income-based model outperforms all alternatives in 16 countries.

Hence, all in all, our findings indicate that linear *income* is the best predictor of preferences for redistribution among the seven operationalizations of SES. The fact that it outperforms categorical variables for *deciles* interestingly indicates that the relationship between income and preferences for redistribution is linear and that linear income conveys the same predictive power more parsimoniously. Moreover, raw income captures not only relative positions within the income distribution (as deciles do) but also the actual difference in income between low and high-income earners. As previously argued, income is highly visible in public discourse and Europeans are more likely to classify people in terms of income rather than in terms of some more abstract conceptualizations. Moreover, while unemployment constitutes one of the most important concerns for individuals in the labor force, neither skill specificity nor the risk of unemployment - except in the case of Lithuania - are generally better predictors of preferences for redistribution. These combined findings suggest that, individual preferences for redistribution are motivated by income aspirations rather than by insurance concerns. We return to this issue in the Discussion.

Although income is clearly the best operationalization of SES in most countries, its predictive power, nevertheless, varies across the 17 countries where linear *income* has a statistically significant effect. Typically, countries where support for redistribution is high show less degree of internal variation by socio-economic status, while countries where demand for redistribution is lower tend to present sharp divides between members of low and high status strata. Take for instance, the cases of Denmark and Portugal, where support for redistribution is the lowest and the highest respectively. In Denmark the probabilities of supporting redistribution for individuals living in households with income two standard deviations above and below the average are .28 and .65, respectively. In the case of Portugal, the probabilities for those two cases are very similar: .92 and .90.

5.3 Robustness of the income effect after considering other conceptualizations

We can still ask ourselves if the effect of income (in countries where it is significant) is still robust to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables. Figure 3 helps us to answer this question by reporting the average marginal effect (AME) of the log of linear *income* on preferences for redistribution. In the first model only *income* is included, while in the following models different SES indicators are included

successively. Results clearly indicate that the effect of income is robust to the inclusion of all other SES predictor in most countries. It has a robust, independent effect in 17 countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia and the United Kingdom. However, it does not have a robust effect in seven countries - Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Portugal, in which the effect of income was not significant or weakly significant in the first place.

Figure 3: AMEs of equivalized income and 95% confidence intervals controlling for alternative indicators of SES, 2012-2018



5.4 Sensitivity analyses

The results reported so far could still be driven by (a) patterns specific to certain age or gender group; (b) the econometric models (logit); (c) the fact that all models so far control for education level; (d) the handling of missing values; and (e) the measure of income. The first question is whether the preponderance of income is uniform across groups in other divides (e.g. gender or age)? To answer this, we conduct a series of robustness checks in which we estimate regression models for specific groups of the population and then compute BIC. First, we focus on the differences between men and women (Tables A4, A5, A6 and A7) and find that, in general, patterns for both men and women are very similar. For women and men, income outperforms other operationalizations in 16 and 15 countries, respectively. Regarding, the differences by two age groups (25-44 and 45-65 years old) (Tables A8 to A11) are also equivalent. For respondents who are 25-44 and 45-65-years-old, income outperforms other operationalizations in 16 and 15 countries, respectively. Therefore, we can conclude that the explanatory power of income is not driven by the critical relevance of this variable in one large segment of the population.

Are the results equivalent using alternative modeling strategies? Additional robustness tests indicate that our findings are not driven by one particular model specification. Ordered logistic (Tables A12 and A13) and OLS models (Tables A14 and A15) for the original dependent variable (without dychotomization) produce the same findings in terms of BIC. Moreover, all conceptualizations of SES are systematically related to education levels. We may, therefore, wonder what is the impact of excluding education as a control variable to compute BIC? After excluding the education variable (Tables A16 and A17), income is still the best model in 19 countries, while the baseline model without SES bests other operationalizations in two countries, the risk of unemployment bests others in Cyprus and Lithuania and routinization in Portugal. Furthermore, other control variables (except year of the survey to account for period effects), such as gender or age may absorb some of the effect of SES. We, therefore, re-estimate all the models removing all the control variables and compute BIC (Tables A18 and A19). After removing the individual control variables, the income based model is still preferred in 18 countries, while the risk of unemployment is preferred in Lithuania, RTI is preferred in Portugal and ESeC is preferred in Finland. Only in the case of Croatia, Cyprus and Latvia is the baseline model (without any SES indicator) the preferred one. This further suggests that the effect of SES is negligible in few particular cases, mostly because there is low variation and high average support for redistribution.

Since several of these conceptualizations generate non-negligible proportions of missing values and this may affect the results, we utilize data imputation in order to use as much information as possible (Table A20). To that end, we use multiple imputation on each explanatory variable (five conceptualizations of SES plus control variables)[11] to generate 10 imputed datasets. We then estimate our models and compute BIC values on each imputed dataset. Estimates align with our previous findings in the sense that income is the preferred model in most of the imputed datasets in most of the countries. In 17 countries the income model has the best fit in all 10 imputed datasets.[12]

Readers may wonder whether the effect of income changes through time. Even though our data cover a limited time period, we divide our sample into two periods (2012-2014 and 2016- 2018) and replicate the analysis of the two periods. Results indicate that the pattern remains almost unchanged from one period to the next (Tables A21, A22, A23 and A24). Finally, we replicate the analysis using AIC values

[11] Multiple imputation was not possible for Kitschelt-Rehm and deciles because of convergence issues related

[12] For the remaining countries, income performs better in Hungary in nine of the imputed datasets. The null model is preferred in most imputed datasets in Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia and Portugal and the risk of unemployment performs better in all the imputed datasets for Lithuania.

instead of BIC values. Considering casewise deletion, to the high number of categories of these operationalizations.linear income or deciles provide a better fit for all 24 countries (Table A25). Using the complete information approach, income based models are still preferred in 14 countries, while Kitschelt-Rehm is preferred is five countries, ESeC is preferred in one country and the model without SES is preferred in four countries (Table A26).

5.5 Fitness improvement produced by conceptualizations other than income

Even if income is the best predictor of preferences for redistribution in terms of the balance between predictive power and parsimony, we can still wonder whether income is just capturing one particular dimension of SES and, to provide a comprehensive model of redistributive preferences, it has to be complemented by other SES variables. To explore this issue we now take the linear income based model as the baseline model and successively include the variables corresponding to each of the other five SES conceptualizations (Tables A27 and A28). Applying this strategy, the baseline model - with linear income - is not outperformed by models including any other operationalization in 21 countries. Only including risk of unemployment in Denmark and Lithuania and only including RTI in the Netherlands we observe a substantial improvement of model fitness (more than 10 points). Therefore, we conclude that, besides very exceptional cases, income is good enough to capture the main effect of SES on preferences for redistribution with other operationalizations providing only marginal, additional explanatory power.

5.6 Alternative Dependent Variable

To what extent is the effect of income on individual preferences confined to the selected outcome: support for redistribution? A case could be made over that the outperformance of the SES operationalization of income on the support for *income* redistribution is not very surprising as the question ultimately asks about beliefs regarding support for "measures to reduce differences in income levels". We, hence, leverage an alternative dependent variable to explore the predictive power of the SES conceptualizations on attitudes towards a related but different set of public policies: preferences for government responsibility in the protection of dependent social groups. We specifically compute an index of government responsibility with two variables measuring agreement on a 10 point scale with the responsibility of government to: (a) 'ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old', and (b) 'ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed'. [13]Results are in line with findings concerning preferences for redistribution (Tables A29 and A30). In the casewise deletion of the missings scenario, income is the preferrred model in 16 out of 18 countries, while in the complete information scenario, (based on the BIC) income is the preferred model in 13 countries. The highest predictive power of income (over alternative operationalizations of SES) is, therefore, certainly not restricted to redistribution preferences. In explaining variations in governmental responsibilities of social protection, income also outperforms other operationalizations of SES.

6 Discussion

In recent decades many social scientists have explored divides concerning redistribution preferences in order to identify macro-level conditions and socio-political coalitions that may facilitate welfare reforms. Following this interest, many publications in economics, political science and sociology have examined the role of SES on redistribution preferences and have consistently shown that objective socio-economic location predicts support for state-driven inequality reduction. However, this body of work is rather

[13] Information for these two variables is only included in ESS round eight and is available for 18 countries. To compute the index we use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and keep the first component, which explains 92.5% of the variance

fragmented due to the plethora of available operationalizations of SES and the disciplinary insularity of debates. This manuscript takes up the task of comparing and contrasting the predictive validity of seven operationalizations of SES that have been the focus of scholarly attention: linear income, categorical income deciles, the ESeC and Kitschelt/Rehm schemas, and indices of skills specificity, unemployment risks, and routine task intensity. The analysis considers 23 EU countries plus the UK in 2012-2018 and to contrast the conceptualizations, we jointly consider the explanatory power and parsimony of the models using a Bayesian approach. The analysis yields two main findings.

First and foremost, income-based operationalizations clearly prevail over all other five approaches. Operationalizations of income predict support for redistribution in 17 of the 24 countries considered. More importantly, income-based variables constitute the most efficient predictor of the outcome in 16 out of 24 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Great Britain. In all these countries income-based indicators of SES provide a better balance between total predictive power and parsimony than the other five operationalizations. It is also noteworthy that the other conceptualizations do not prove particularly efficient predictors in any particular cluster of countries. Indeed, no SES conceptualization has significant predictive power in seven other countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Hungary, Italy, Latvia and Portugal and the risk of unemployment risk actually represents the most informative predictor only in Lithuania. In sum, considering in combination explanatory power and parsimony, income-based variables achieve the highest data fit for 16 countries and unemployment risk the highest fit for an single additional country.

Second, of the two income-based conceptualizations considered - one with linear income and an alternative with a multicategorical variable for income deciles -, linear income marginally stands out. Fitness statistics are generally better for the two income operationalizations than for those associated with large class schemas and indexes capturing occupational characteristics, but they become quite similar once income is operationalized in linear or categorical terms. Also importantly, similar results are obtained using alternative regression strategies, other transformations of the outcome, multiple imputation, replicating the analysis for each gender and major age groups and without controlling for individual education. Income, moreover, is not only the best predictor of redistribution attitudes. It is also the best predictor of perceptions of government responsibility to protect dependent groups.

Future research on the mechanisms of the SES effect on political-economic preferences might shed light on the ultimate causes for the preeminence of income conceptualization. However we speculate that the primacy of income over other conceptualizations of SES may be due to the fact that (i) income constitutes a culturally-preeminent category of classification (rich/poor; high/middle/low income) and (ii) that contemporary household income is a better predictor of permanent income over the life course than measures of occupations or social class (Brady et al. 2018; Shahbazian and Bihagen 2022).

These results have important implications for the burgeoning literatures on attitudes towards redistribution and social policy. Most directly, for scholars interested either in (a) examining country-level factors shaping SES effects or (b) simply seeking to control for the SES dimension, the linear version of income offers a comprehensive and efficient solution. Since this operationalization has the desirable property of capturing the largest amount of information at the lowest level of impact on parsimony, scholars interested in either of the two questions can feel confident that effects of SES-as-income captures well the influence of socio-economic location and they can thus concentrate on non-SES-related individual-level variables or country-level effects.

The findings of this study also call into question standard theory-testing approaches of recent research in the self-interest approach. Most previous studies assess the added value of SES operationalizations by considering whether a given factor has a statistically significant effect that is independent from the usual suspects. This is a non-stringent approach to theory testing, which does not clarify if the effect of the new variable is (a) substantial, (b) larger or equivalent to that of income, and (c) with sufficient explanatory

power to compensate for lower parsimony. In light of the results of this study, contributions to the self-interest approach should seek to improve or at least meet the predictive validity of the income predictor.

In more general terms, the fact that current income has stronger predictive power than operationalizations capturing the risk of future declines in standards of living - e.g. those reflecting skills specificity, automatization and, especially, occupational unemployment - offers hints over the mechanisms linking self-interests to formation of redistributive preferences. It indicates that short-term economic aspirations may outweight concerns over future potential conditions in the formation of those preferences. Perceptions of future personal risks may not have such a great relevance in opinion formation as assumed by central models in political economy.

This study certainly has limitations. To minimize the risk of reserve causality, the analysis does not consider a fully comprehensive range of factors predicting redistribution preferences. Other-regardingness beliefs, for instance, also shape these preferences. As it focuses on individual-level dynamics, the above analysis does not consider macro-level conditions affecting the higher predictive power of income either. The study cannot determine if similar patterns are observable for other high-income countries like North American ones.

Future work could fruitfully explore three unresolved questions. First, the broad comparative approach of this study has allowed us to confirm that SES does not universally predict redistribution preferences. In at least seven European countries, SES does not impact these policy attitudes. Case studies of these deviant countries can potentially shed light on the reasons why individuals might hold redistribution preferences inconsistent with their own interests (Lipset et al. 1962; Lukes 2021). Such analyses could, thus, help reveal general psychological and social mechanisms of attitude formation. Second, given that linear income is by far the most reliable operationalization of SES in terms of predictive power, more methodological research is also needed regarding the operationalization of this aspect. Future work could, furthermore, explore if income has a greater predictive power of attitudes if measured at individual or house- hold level, by employing best survey-design strategies. Finally, more research is clearly needed regarding the political, psychological and social mechanisms linking income levels and policy attitude formation. Until that work is conducted, this study advances the literature by showing that income represents a more effective predictor of redistribution attitudes than the ESeC and Kitschelt-Rehm schemas and indexes of specific skills, unemployment risks and routine task intensity.

7 References

Alesina, Alberto and George-Marios Angeletos. 2005. "Fairness and redistribution." *American economic review* 95(4):960–980.

Autor, David H. and David Dorn. 2013. "The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polar- ization of the US Labor Market." *American Economic Review* 103(5):1553–97.

Barone, Carlo, Florian R Hertel and Oscar Smallenbroek. 2021. "What we think when we speak about stratification." *SocArXiv. January* 7.

Benabou, Roland and Efe A Ok. 2001. "Social mobility and the demand for redistribution: the POUM hypothesis." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 116(2):447–487.

Beramendi, Pablo and Philipp Rehm. 2016. "Who gives, who gains? Progressivity and Prefer- ences." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(4):529–563.

Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. 2011. *A cooperative species*. Princeton University Press.

Brady, David and Amie Bostic. 2015. "Paradoxes of social policy: Welfare transfers, relative poverty, and redistribution preferences." *American Sociological Review* 80(2):268–298.

Brady, David, Marco Giesselmann, Ulrich Kohler and Anke Radenacker. 2018. "How to measure and proxy permanent income: evidence from Germany and the US." *The Journal of Economic Inequality* 16(3):321–345.

Breznau, Nate and Carola Hommerich. 2019. "No generalizable effect of income inequality on public support for governmental redistribution among rich democracies 1987–2010." *Social Science Research* 81:170–191.

Busemeyer, Marius R and Alexander HJ Sahm. 2021. "Social investment, redistribution or basic income? Exploring the association between automation risk and welfare state attitudes in Europe." *Journal of Social Policy* pp. 1–20.

Carriero, Renzo. 2021. "Social Position and Support for the Welfare State in Western European Countries. A Test of Oesch's Class Schema and a Comparison with ESEC." *Polis* 36(1):41–68. Chancel, Lucas, Thomas Piketty Emmanuel Saenz and Gabriel Zucman. 2022. *Global Carbon Inequality, 1990-2019: The Impact of Wealth Concentration on the Distribution of World*

Emissions. World Inequality Lab.

Christenko, Aleksandr, Žilvinas Martinaitis and Simonas Gaušas. 2020. "Specific and general skills: Concepts, dimensions, and measurements." *Competition & Change* 24(1):44–69.

Christoph, Bernhard, Britta Matthes and Christian Ebner. 2020. "Occupation-Based Mea- sures—An Overview and Discussion." *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsy- chologie* 72(1):41–78.

Claeskens, Gerda and Nils Lid Hjort. 2008. *Model Selection and Model Averaging*. Cambridge University Press.

Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen and Philipp Rehm. 2006. "Risks at work: The demand and supply sides of government redistribution." *Oxford review of economic policy* 22(3):365–389.

Cusak, Thomas, Torben Iversen and Philipp Rehmn. 2006. "Risks at Work: The Demand and Supply Side of Government Redistribution." *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 22(3):365–389. Dabla-Norris, Ms Era, Ms Kalpana Kochhar, Mrs Nujin Suphaphiphat, Mr Frantisek Ricka and Ms Evridiki Tsounta. 2015. *Causes and consequences of income inequality: A global*

perspective. International Monetary Fund.

Dallinger, Ursula. 2010. "Public support for redistribution: what explains cross-national differ- ences?" *Journal of European Social Policy* 20(4):333–349.

Dimick, Matthew, David Rueda and Daniel Stegmueller. 2018. "Models of other-regarding pref- erences, inequality, and redistribution." *Annual Review of Political Science* 21:441–460.

Doherty, Daniel, Alan S Gerber and Donald P Green. 2006. "Personal income and attitudes toward redistribution: A study of lottery winners." *Political Psychology* 27(3):441–458.

Engelhardt, Carina and Andreas Wagener. 2018. "What do Germans think and know about income inequality? A survey experiment." *Socio-Economic Review* 16(4):743–767.

Eurostat. 2021. "European Union-Labor Force Survey."

Evans, Geoffrey and Noah Carl. 2017. Class and politics. In *The Sage Handbook of Political Sociology*, ed. William Outhwaite and Stephen P. Turner. pp. 107–124.

Fernández, Juan J and Antonio M Jaime-Castillo. 2018. "The institutional foundation of social class differences in pro-redistribution attitudes: a cross-national analysis, 1985–2010." *Social Forces* 96(3):1009–1038.

Finseraas, Henning. 2009. "Income inequality and demand for redistribution: A multilevel analysis of European public opinion." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 32(1):94–119.

Fong, Christina. 2001. "Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution."

Journal of Public economics 82(2):225–246.

Gallego, Aina, Alexander Kuo, Dulce Manzano and José Fernández-Albertos. 2022. "Technolog- ical risk and policy preferences." *Comparative Political Studies* 55(1):60–92.

Gallego, Aina and Thomas Kurer. 2022. "Automation, Digitalization, and Artificial Intelligence in the Workplace: Implications for Political Behavior." *Annual Review of Political Science* 25.

Gelepithis, Margarita and Marco Giani. 2022. "Inclusion without solidarity: education, economic security, and attitudes toward redistribution." *Political Studies* 70(1):45–61.

Goldthorpe, John H. 2000. *On sociology*. Vol. 1 Stanford University Press.

Goos, Maarten, Alan Manning and Anna Salomons. 2014. "Explaining Job Polariza- tion: Routine-Biased Technological Change and Offshoring." *American Economic Review* 104(8):2509–26.

Guillaud, Elvire. 2013. "Preferences for redistribution: an empirical analysis over 33 countries."

The Journal of Economic Inequality 11(1):57–78.

Häusermann, Silja and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2015. What do voters want? Dimensions and configu- rations in individual-level preferences and party choice. In *The politics of advanced capitalism*, ed. Beramendi, Pablo, Silja Häusermann, Herbert Kitschelt, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Cambridge University Press pp. 202–230.

Hollenbach, Florian M. and Jacob M. Montgomery. 2020. The SAGE Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations. SAGE Publications chapter Bayesian Model Selection, Model Comparison, and Model Averaging.

Iversen, Torben and David Soskice. 2001. "An asset theory of social policy preferences." *American political science review* 95(4):875–893.

Jordan, Jason. 2014. "Religious belief, religious denomination, and preferences for redistribution: a comparison across 13 countries." *West European Politics* 37(1):19–41.

Kevins, Anthony, Alexander Horn, Carsten Jensen and Kees Van Kersbergen. 2019. "The illusion of class in welfare state politics?" *Journal of Social Policy* 48(1):21–41.

Kitschelt, Herbert and Philipp Rehm. 2014. “Occupations as a site of political preference for- mation.” *Comparative Political Studies* 47(12):1670–1706.

Kitschelt, Herbert et al. 1994. *The transformation of European social democracy*. cambridge university press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier and Tim- otheos Frey. 2008. *West European politics in the age of globalization*. Cambridge University Press.

Kumlin, Staffan. 2007. The welfare state: Values, policy preferences, and performance evalua- tions. In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, ed. Russell J. Dalton. pp. XXX–XXX.

Lindh, Arvid and Leslie McCall. 2020. “Class position and political opinion in rich democracies.”

Annual Review of Sociology 46:419–441.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1960. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, James S Coleman, Martin A Trow and Clark Kerr. 1962. Union Democ- racy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographical Union: what Makes Democracy Work in Labor Unions and Other Organizations? Doubleday.

Lukes, Steven. 2021. *Power: A radical view*. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Mahutga, Matthew C, Michaela Curran and Anthony Roberts. 2018. “Job tasks and the com- parative structure of income and employment: Routine task intensity and offshorability for the LIS*.” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 59(2):81–109.

Manza, Jeff and Ned Crowley. 2018. Class divisions and political attitudes in the 21st century. In *The Handbook of Attitudes*, ed. Dolores Albarracín and Blair T. Johnson. Routledge pp. 367– 397.Mau, Steffen, Jan Mewes and Nadine M Schöneck. 2012. “What determines subjective socio- economic insecurity? Context and class in comparative perspective.” *Socio-economic review* 10(4):655–682.

McCall, Leslie and Jeff Manza. 2011. Class differences in social and political attitudes in the United States. In *The Oxford handbook of American public opinion and the media*, ed. Lawrence R. Jacobs George, C. Edwards III and Robert Y. Shapiro. Oxford University Press. Meltzer, Allan H and Scott F Richard. 1981. “A rational theory of the size of government.”

Journal of political Economy 89(5):914–927.

Moene, Karl Ove and Michael Wallerstein. 2003. “Earnings inequality and welfare spending: A disaggregated analysis.” *World Politics* 55(4):485–516.

Mosimann, Nadja and Jonas Pontusson. 2022. “Varieties of trade unions and support for redis- tribution.” *West European Politics* pp. 1–24.

Oesch, Daniel. 2006. Redrawing the class map: Stratification and institutions in Britain, Ger- many, Sweden and Switzerland. Springer.

Owens, Lindsay A and David S Pedulla. 2014. “Material welfare and changing political prefer- ences: The case of support for redistributive social policies.” *Social Forces* 92(3):1087–1113.

Paskov, Marii and David Weisstanner. 2022. “Cross-Class Embeddedness through Family Ties and Support for Income Redistribution.” *European Sociological Review* 38(2):286–303.

Piketty, Thomas. 2018. *Capital in the twenty-first century*. Harvard University Press.

Raffalovich, Lawrence E., Glenn D. Deane, David Armstrong and Hui-Shien Tsao. 2008. “Model selection procedures in social research: Monte-Carlo simulation results.” *Journal of Applied Statistics* 35(10):1093–1114.

Raftery, Adrian E. 1995. “Bayesian model selection in social research.” *Sociological methodology*

pp. 111–163.

Rehm, Philipp. 2009. “Risks and redistribution: An individual-level analysis.” *Comparative political studies* 42(7):855–881.

Rehm, Philipp. 2011. “Social policy by popular demand.” *World Politics* 63(2):271–299.

Rehm, Philipp. 2016. Risk inequality and welfare states: Social policy preferences, development, and dynamics. Cambridge University Press.

Roberts, Kevin W.S. 1977. “Voting over income tax schedules.” *Journal of Public Economics* 8. Roller, Edeltraud. 1995. The welfare state: The equality dimension. Oxford University Press

Oxford.

Rose, David and Eric Harrison. 2010. Social class in Europe: An introduction to the European Socio-economic Classification. Routledge.

Rueda, David. 2018. “Food comes first, then morals: Redistribution preferences, parochial altruism, and immigration in Western Europe.” *The Journal of Politics* 80(1):225–239.

Schmidt-Catran, Alexander W. 2016. “Economic inequality and public demand for redis- tribution: Combining cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence.” *Socio-Economic Review* 14(1):119–140.

Shahbazian, Roujman and Erik Bihagen. 2022. “Does Your Class Give More than a Hint of Your Lifetime Earnings?: Assessing Indicators for Lifetime Earnings Over the Life Course for Sweden.” *European Sociological Review* .

Smallenbroek, Oscar, Florian R Hertel and Carlo Barone. 2021. “Measuring class hierarchies in postindustrial societies: a criterion and construct validation of EGP and ESEC across 31 countries.”.

Thewissen, Stefan and David Rueda. 2019. “Automation and the welfare state: Technolog- ical change as a determinant of redistribution preferences.” *Comparative Political Studies*

52(2):171–208.

Vlandas, Tim. 2021. “The political economy of individual-level support for the basic income in Europe.” *Journal of European Social Policy* 31(1):62–77.

Walter, Stefanie. 2017. “Globalization and the demand-side of politics: How globalization shapes labor market risk perceptions and policy preferences.” *Political Science Research and Methods* 5(1):55–80.

Weber, Max. 2019. *Economy and society*. Harvard University Press.

Weeden, Kim A and David B Grusky. 2012. “The three worlds of inequality.” *American Journal of Sociology* 117(6):1723–1785.

Wirth, Heike, Cornelia Gresch, Walter Müller, Reinhard Pollak and Felix Weiss. 2009. “Validat- ing the ESeC-scheme as operationalization of social class.” *The case of Germany. Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung. Arbeitspapier* 119.

8 Appendix

8.1 Appendix A

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Redistribution Preference	99,391	0.739	0.439	0	1
Control variables					
Female	100,652	0.535	0.499	0	1
Age					
25-34 years	100,674	0.206	0.405	0	1
35-44 years	100,674	0.241	0.428	0	1
45-54 years	100,674	0.261	0.439	0	1
55-65 years	100,674	0.291	0.454	0	1
Education					
Lower secondary or less	100,171	0.195	0.396	0	1
Upper secondary	100,171	0.533	0.499	0	1
University	100,171	0.272	0.445	0	1
Conceptualizations					
Household income (log)	82,005	9.950	0.956	6.957	13.554
Risk of unemployment	96,227	0.060	0.055	0.000	0.383
Skill specificity	95,260	4.035	3.470	0.902	49.295
RTI	95,304	-0.090	0.986	-1.465	2.410
Household income (deciles)					
1st decile	82,908	0.080	0.271	0	1
2nd decile	82,908	0.087	0.282	0	1
3rd decile	82,908	0.095	0.293	0	1
4th decile	82,908	0.102	0.302	0	1
5th decile	82,908	0.106	0.307	0	1
6th decile	82,908	0.109	0.312	0	1
7th decile	82,908	0.115	0.319	0	1
8th decile	82,908	0.113	0.317	0	1
9th decile	82,908	0.097	0.296	0	1
10th decile	82,908	0.097	0.296	0	1
ESeC					
Higher managers & profs.	96,248	0.192	0.394	0	1
Lower managers & profs.	96,248	0.185	0.388	0	1
Intermediate occupations	96,248	0.077	0.267	0	1
Small employers (no agricult.)	96,248	0.066	0.248	0	1
Small employers (agriculture)	96,248	0.015	0.120	0	1
Lower superv. and technicians	96,248	0.073	0.260	0	1
Lower sales and service	96,248	0.147	0.354	0	1
Lower technical workers	96,248	0.108	0.311	0	1
Routine workers	96,248	0.137	0.344	0	1
Kitschelt-Rehm					
Technical experts	96,119	0.039	0.193	0	1

Technicians	96,119	0.044	0.205	0	1
Skilled manual workers	96,119	0.166	0.372	0	1
Low-skilled manual workers	96,119	0.091	0.288	0	1
Higher-grade managers	96,119	0.099	0.298	0	1
Lower-grade managers	96,119	0.090	0.286	0	1
Skilled clerks	96,119	0.094	0.291	0	1
Unskilled clerks	96,119	0.014	0.117	0	1
Socio-cultural professionals	96,119	0.051	0.219	0	1
Socio-cultural semi-prof.	96,119	0.087	0.282	0	1
Skilled service workers	96,119	0.121	0.326	0	1
Low-skilled service workers	96,119	0.106	0.308	0	1

Table A2: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences - Casewise deletion

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	4,251	3,274*	3,355	4,192	4,226	4,144	4,142	4,113
Belgium	5,504	5,237*	5,270	5,384	5,386	5,343	5,353	5,342
Bulgaria	2,164	1,730*	1,783	2,147	2,163	2,100	2,115	2,091
Croatia	1,048	795*	853	1,036	1,054	989	990	982
Cyprus	1,281	1,017*	1,062	1,235	1,260	1,197	1,197	1,194
Czech Republic	8,161	5,900*	5,961	7,897	7,951	7,890	7,902	7,899
Denmark	3,926	3,633*	3,676	3,858	3,848	3,818	3,850	3,846
Estonia	6,074	4,333*	4,396	5,941	5,946	5,925	5,918	5,918
Finland	5,746	5,521	5,524	5,557	5,562	5,571	5,589	5,567
France	5,824	5,352*	5,363	5,669	5,702	5,630	5,606	5,570
Germany	8,554	7,683*	7,744	8,343	8,262	8,336	8,180	8,115
Hungary	3,780	2,493*	2,561	3,496	3,509	3,443	3,444	3,437
Ireland	7,426	5,621*	5,694	6,989	6,996	6,972	6,806	6,786
Italy	3,544	2,007*	2,076	3,091	3,092	3,039	3,035	3,017
Latvia	604	533*	567	647	663	603	605	606
Lithuania	3,661	3,055*	3,105	3,536	3,547	3,482	3,484	3,464
Netherlands	6,320	5,620*	5,610	6,206	6,214	6,220	6,193	6,172
Poland	4,730	3,513*	3,583	4,593	4,579	4,571	4,538	4,533
Portugal	2,181	1,656*	1,715	2,104	2,126	2,055	2,035	2,031
Slovakia	2,298	1,469*	1,544	2,227	2,243	2,179	2,183	2,180
Slovenia	2,770	2,246*	2,295	2,570	2,556	2,533	2,544	2,541
Spain	4,385	3,599*	3,657	4,205	4,238	4,160	4,170	4,150
Sweden	5,235	4,992*	5,020	5,220	5,239	5,191	5,197	5,172
UK	7,065	6,134*	6,179	6,736	6,711	6,707	6,652	6,615

Note: * SES conceptualization with the lowest BIC and at least a 10 point difference with the second lowest BIC

Table A3: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences - Complete information

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	3,195	3,182*	3,261	3,252	3,286	3,201	3,203	3,203
Belgium	5,110	5,087*	5,120	5,148	5,147	5,105	5,117	5,115
Bulgaria	1,687	1,680	1,731	1,729	1,745	1,684	1,694	1,687
Croatia	759	765	818	811	833	765	766	762
Cyprus	939	946	992	978	1,006	941	945	946
Czech Republic	5,777	5,729*	5,787	5,780	5,825	5,765	5,776	5,784
Denmark	3,585	3,550*	3,594	3,604	3,603	3,567	3,593	3,591
Estonia	4,298	4,246*	4,308	4,311	4,336	4,284	4,304	4,305
Finland	5,415	5,352	5,357	5,380	5,391	5,397	5,415	5,414
France	5,201	5,139*	5,149	5,224	5,267	5,190	5,209	5,199
Germany	7,412	7,302*	7,366	7,390	7,373	7,374	7,411	7,418
Hungary	2,340	2,344	2,411	2,403	2,404	2,347	2,348	2,342
Ireland	5,276	5,215*	5,284	5,308	5,314	5,282	5,284	5,285
Italy	1,750	1,747	1,816	1,801	1,806	1,751	1,758	1,754
Latvia	525	529	564	574	589	529	529	531
Lithuania	2,904	2,913*	2,960	2,954	2,961	2,894	2,913	2,912
Netherlands	5,604	5,490	5,484	5,610	5,613	5,612	5,612	5,612
Poland	3,447	3,411*	3,477	3,461	3,462	3,450	3,454	3,453
Portugal	1,550	1,557	1,617	1,602	1,625	1,558	1,552	1,550
Slovakia	1,443	1,387*	1,462	1,482	1,500	1,439	1,450	1,448
Slovenia	2,116	2,067*	2,127	2,148	2,141	2,112	2,124	2,124
Spain	3,446	3,431*	3,487	3,479	3,520	3,442	3,452	3,449
Sweden	4,955	4,935*	4,963	4,987	5,001	4,957	4,963	4,962
UK	5,874	5,794*	5,838	5,881	5,882	5,839	5,881	5,871

Table A4: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences for men - Casewise deletion

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	2,151	1,653*	1,719	2,163	2,180	2,108	2,107	2,090
Belgium	2,886	2,740*	2,787	2,867	2,871	2,827	2,833	2,825
Bulgaria	1,019	813*	866	1,025	1,032	978	989	977
Croatia	491	382*	432	526	540	484	484	479
Cyprus	605	478*	517	620	636	582	581	580
Czech Republic	3,890	2,793*	2,850	3,813	3,855	3,783	3,790	3,782
Denmark	1,966	1,890*	1,929	1,944	1,950	1,917	1,934	1,933
Estonia	2,975	2,139*	2,195	2,927	2,944	2,889	2,892	2,891
Finland	3,176	3,082*	3,120	3,062	3,051	3,067	3,081	3,068
France	2,976	2,750*	2,769	2,956	2,961	2,911	2,885	2,872
Germany	4,528	4,103*	4,149	4,443	4,407	4,426	4,351	4,320
Hungary	1,667	1,115*	1,175	1,602	1,616	1,548	1,551	1,550
Ireland	3,534	2,699*	2,756	3,408	3,411	3,378	3,271	3,253
Italy	1,811	1,021*	1,079	1,737	1,746	1,682	1,687	1,671
Latvia	253	233*	272	295	306	257	258	257
Lithuania	1,575	1,299*	1,347	1,569	1,581	1,516	1,507	1,488
Netherlands	2,936	2,690	2,696	2,914	2,932	2,909	2,893	2,880
Poland	2,341	1,732*	1,790	2,323	2,335	2,293	2,282	2,281
Portugal	1,014	766*	817	1,002	1,027	966	949	946
Slovakia	1,090	741*	790	1,073	1,088	1,033	1,036	1,033
Slovenia	1,429	1,166*	1,207	1,388	1,396	1,350	1,357	1,353
Spain	2,313	1,910*	1,953	2,298	2,321	2,248	2,255	2,247
Sweden	2,760	2,640*	2,686	2,787	2,804	2,742	2,745	2,737
UK	3,212	2,795*	2,844	3,079	3,062	3,045	3,016	2,994

Table A5: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences for men - Complete information

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	1,622	1,613	1,680	1,678	1,702	1,626	1,628	1,629
Belgium	2,699	2,680*	2,727	2,738	2,737	2,698	2,706	2,704
Bulgaria	796	792	845	844	856	797	803	795
Croatia	374	379	429	419	434	380	380	374
Cyprus	452	458	497	493	512	456	458	458
Czech Republic	2,747	2,726*	2,782	2,773	2,807	2,743	2,752	2,755
Denmark	1,859	1,851	1,890	1,881	1,887	1,852	1,866	1,866
Estonia	2,112	2,097*	2,152	2,152	2,167	2,107	2,114	2,117
Finland	3,006	2,979	3,018	2,990	2,984	2,994	3,009	3,009
France	2,690	2,656*	2,675	2,740	2,752	2,696	2,698	2,694
Germany	3,958	3,909*	3,960	3,964	3,972	3,937	3,963	3,964
Hungary	1,057	1,061	1,122	1,113	1,128	1,062	1,064	1,063
Ireland	2,559	2,533*	2,588	2,602	2,610	2,564	2,566	2,566
Italy	962	964	1,020	1,018	1,027	964	969	969
Latvia	229	233	272	265	282	233	233	234
Lithuania	1,229	1,236	1,278	1,285	1,300	1,232	1,236	1,236
Netherlands	2,697	2,638*	2,645	2,715	2,729	2,703	2,704	2,701
Poland	1,713	1,703*	1,756	1,739	1,748	1,719	1,720	1,719
Portugal	716	722	776	758	782	723	717	713
Slovakia	735	699*	747	770	785	734	741	739
Slovenia	1,138	1,111*	1,158	1,178	1,183	1,139	1,144	1,144
Spain	1,863	1,865	1,907	1,911	1,933	1,863	1,867	1,870
Sweden	2,621	2,614	2,661	2,672	2,687	2,626	2,628	2,626
UK	2,684	2,627*	2,673	2,696	2,693	2,648	2,690	2,683

Table A6: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences for women - Casewise deletion

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	
Austria	2,168	1,695*	1,756	2,149	2,174	2,112	2,110	2,098
Belgium	2,691	2,573*	2,617	2,644	2,649	2,593	2,599	2,596
Bulgaria	1,207	983*	1,033	1,235	1,255	1,188	1,194	1,180
Croatia	598	451*	503	597	611	555	556	552
Cyprus	721	583*	626	707	719	665	666	664
Czech Republic	4,352	3,189*	3,242	4,222	4,249	4,195	4,198	4,201
Denmark	2,020	1,808*	1,866	2,014	2,014	1,968	1,982	1,978
Estonia	3,180	2,268*	2,333	3,145	3,159	3,121	3,112	3,113
Finland	2,650	2,524*	2,548	2,630	2,641	2,588	2,594	2,584
France	2,926	2,685*	2,730	2,847	2,872	2,799	2,806	2,783
Germany	4,109	3,670*	3,744	4,045	4,020	3,999	3,916	3,882
Hungary	2,185	1,452*	1,515	2,024	2,044	1,972	1,972	1,967
Ireland	3,963	2,997*	3,064	3,710	3,732	3,669	3,616	3,609
Italy	1,805	1,054*	1,116	1,481	1,484	1,432	1,423	1,418
Latvia	383	334*	367	425	439	384	386	386
Lithuania	2,154	1,825*	1,887	2,098	2,113	2,038	2,053	2,051
Netherlands	3,459	3,009*	3,046	3,420	3,431	3,389	3,383	3,368
Poland	2,465	1,858*	1,920	2,394	2,395	2,362	2,338	2,335
Portugal	1,238	968*	1,027	1,217	1,237	1,163	1,156	1,154
Slovakia	1,268	789*	854	1,257	1,272	1,211	1,212	1,211
Slovenia	1,410	1,151*	1,202	1,303	1,297	1,256	1,258	1,256
Spain	2,148	1,772*	1,837	2,035	2,055	1,993	1,996	1,982
Sweden	2,551	2,434*	2,474	2,557	2,579	2,532	2,536	2,518
UK	3,927	3,414*	3,464	3,784	3,787	3,735	3,714	3,698

Table A7: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences for women - Complete information

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	1,641	1,643	1,704	1,694	1,717	1,648	1,648	1,649
Belgium	2,483	2,482	2,524	2,537	2,540	2,484	2,490	2,489
Bulgaria	950	953	1,003	997	1,011	953	957	956
Croatia	421	426	475	463	482	426	427	427
Cyprus	527	532	577	573	584	530	533	533
Czech Republic	3,104	3,083*	3,132	3,140	3,164	3,102	3,104	3,109
Denmark	1,785	1,764*	1,822	1,824	1,832	1,781	1,792	1,790
Estonia	2,255	2,223*	2,288	2,279	2,307	2,251	2,262	2,263
Finland	2,486	2,456*	2,482	2,523	2,537	2,487	2,490	2,488
France	2,588	2,566	2,609	2,619	2,647	2,573	2,595	2,589
Germany	3,533	3,480*	3,552	3,567	3,560	3,521	3,534	3,540
Hungary	1,350	1,357	1,418	1,413	1,421	1,358	1,358	1,354
Ireland	2,785	2,759*	2,828	2,831	2,850	2,792	2,791	2,792
Italy	849	850	913	897	900	854	856	845
Latvia	327	330	365	373	384	332	332	333
Lithuania	1,739	1,747	1,809	1,792	1,800	1,732	1,747	1,746
Netherlands	2,981	2,931*	2,969	3,021	3,031	2,986	2,989	2,987
Poland	1,802	1,785*	1,846	1,841	1,851	1,805	1,810	1,808
Portugal	902	909	970	961	979	910	908	908
Slovakia	763	747*	813	810	827	766	770	769
Slovenia	1,037	1,027*	1,084	1,085	1,084	1,041	1,044	1,042
Spain	1,657	1,646*	1,711	1,692	1,727	1,660	1,665	1,657
Sweden	2,410	2,403	2,441	2,433	2,457	2,414	2,417	2,417
UK	3,263	3,242*	3,292	3,313	3,328	3,263	3,271	3,266

Table A8: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences for young people (25-44) - Casewise deletion

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	2,071	1,608*	1,685	2,077	2,101	2,028	2,027	2,017
Belgium	2,602	2,500*	2,551	2,569	2,586	2,531	2,537	2,531
Bulgaria	900	723*	779	904	918	869	874	864
Croatia	512	367*	417	540	564	503	503	496
Cyprus	670	541*	588	669	680	630	631	630
Czech Republic	3,950	2,865*	2,912	3,850	3,887	3,815	3,820	3,817
Denmark	1,682	1,565*	1,617	1,682	1,678	1,640	1,659	1,656
Estonia	3,118	2,167*	2,221	3,032	3,060	3,026	3,025	3,025
Finland	2,687	2,618	2,659	2,641	2,646	2,615	2,614	2,606
France	2,724	2,557*	2,586	2,679	2,705	2,638	2,621	2,604
Germany	3,510	3,176*	3,230	3,462	3,432	3,420	3,321	3,306
Hungary	1,788	1,149*	1,205	1,651	1,668	1,601	1,602	1,598
Ireland	3,779	2,906*	2,970	3,596	3,606	3,560	3,483	3,467
Italy	1,620	892*	951	1,411	1,410	1,364	1,365	1,355
Latvia	285	265*	296	325	327	287	286	288
Lithuania	1,763	1,495*	1,550	1,700	1,720	1,663	1,662	1,649
Netherlands	2,828	2,562*	2,606	2,782	2,815	2,772	2,766	2,757
Poland	2,507	1,833*	1,889	2,471	2,456	2,424	2,401	2,402
Portugal	1,051	786*	839	1,070	1,091	1,021	1,013	1,005
Slovakia	1,073	711*	772	1,038	1,045	995	1,000	996
Slovenia	1,337	1,095*	1,133	1,215	1,215	1,179	1,179	1,179
Spain	2,120	1,759*	1,810	2,082	2,106	2,037	2,039	2,024
Sweden	2,520	2,411*	2,456	2,529	2,542	2,494	2,497	2,481
UK	3,203	2,849*	2,903	3,066	3,052	3,022	2,996	2,977

Table A9: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences for young people (25-44) - Complete information

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	1,582	1,570*	1,646	1,638	1,666	1,590	1,590	1,590
Belgium	2,434	2,427	2,477	2,474	2,491	2,435	2,441	2,441
Bulgaria	699	700	754	735	750	703	705	703
Croatia	360	363	413	404	425	365	366	364
Cyprus	507	513	559	545	563	510	512	512
Czech Republic	2,803	2,780*	2,827	2,846	2,878	2,804	2,810	2,809
Denmark	1,538	1,533	1,586	1,573	1,573	1,530	1,543	1,543
Estonia	2,152	2,119	2,172	2,159	2,198	2,150	2,158	2,159
Finland	2,560	2,535*	2,578	2,593	2,601	2,566	2,565	2,567
France	2,481	2,448*	2,473	2,519	2,550	2,481	2,488	2,477
Germany	3,013	2,995*	3,051	3,054	3,058	3,016	3,017	3,020
Hungary	1,064	1,068*	1,121	1,116	1,122	1,071	1,070	1,071
Ireland	2,743	2,716*	2,781	2,783	2,796	2,751	2,751	2,751
Italy	766	763	821	811	813	765	771	768
Latvia	257	262	294	298	300	262	260	263
Lithuania	1,407	1,413	1,468	1,438	1,465	1,403	1,415	1,408
Netherlands	2,531	2,497*	2,541	2,551	2,582	2,537	2,537	2,537
Poland	1,792	1,772*	1,828	1,837	1,828	1,795	1,799	1,799
Portugal	755	757	812	804	828	762	761	752
Slovakia	684	657*	719	725	728	684	691	685
Slovenia	984	972*	1,017	1,025	1,031	987	990	991
Spain	1,698	1,685*	1,735	1,744	1,769	1,703	1,704	1,700
Sweden	2,382	2,374	2,417	2,421	2,432	2,384	2,388	2,389
UK	2,691	2,672*	2,728	2,731	2,737	2,684	2,698	2,695

Table A10: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences for old people (45-65) - Casewise deletion

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	2,235	1,726*	1,781	2,230	2,252	2,178	2,179	2,160
Belgium	2,958	2,799*	2,838	2,918	2,932	2,872	2,877	2,869
Bulgaria	1,300	1,047*	1,094	1,325	1,341	1,274	1,283	1,270
Croatia	568	461*	506	571	580	525	525	525
Cyprus	650	518*	563	644	668	608	608	607
Czech Republic	4,274	3,101*	3,168	4,169	4,201	4,143	4,143	4,151
Denmark	2,298	2,125*	2,173	2,279	2,290	2,238	2,252	2,249
Estonia	3,017	2,225*	2,293	3,020	3,027	2,968	2,962	2,961
Finland	3,116	2,967*	2,991	3,024	3,038	3,005	3,040	3,019
France	3,163	2,862*	2,902	3,113	3,131	3,060	3,053	3,033
Germany	5,114	4,574*	4,638	4,992	4,968	4,983	4,934	4,884
Hungary	2,046	1,410*	1,476	1,956	1,967	1,901	1,902	1,895
Ireland	3,705	2,773*	2,839	3,506	3,525	3,477	3,385	3,382
Italy	1,970	1,166*	1,227	1,783	1,797	1,728	1,721	1,715
Latvia	344	296*	331	383	401	345	348	348
Lithuania	1,960	1,627*	1,682	1,942	1,957	1,888	1,890	1,876
Netherlands	3,550	3,117	3,112	3,533	3,528	3,510	3,490	3,479
Poland	2,282	1,737*	1,808	2,237	2,253	2,213	2,203	2,191
Portugal	1,192	932*	993	1,149	1,169	1,100	1,088	1,090
Slovakia	1,271	803*	859	1,284	1,297	1,234	1,234	1,232
Slovenia	1,480	1,208*	1,266	1,463	1,459	1,412	1,420	1,420
Spain	2,328	1,908*	1,969	2,247	2,269	2,193	2,201	2,197
Sweden	2,775	2,646*	2,674	2,796	2,822	2,763	2,766	2,756
UK	3,927	3,350*	3,394	3,792	3,789	3,756	3,727	3,710

Table A11: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences for old people (45-65) - Complete information

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	1,669	1,673	1,728	1,725	1,745	1,672	1,676	1,676
Belgium	2,729	2,720	2,760	2,774	2,788	2,729	2,736	2,731
Bulgaria	1,021	1,019	1,066	1,065	1,089	1,021	1,028	1,025
Croatia	430	435	476	480	491	436	436	435
Cyprus	469	474	520	507	525	473	475	475
Czech Republic	3,035	3,015*	3,080	3,052	3,077	3,028	3,030	3,042
Denmark	2,099	2,074*	2,120	2,133	2,150	2,094	2,106	2,106
Estonia	2,202	2,187*	2,253	2,251	2,267	2,198	2,209	2,209
Finland	2,913	2,881	2,906	2,893	2,911	2,881	2,914	2,905
France	2,781	2,758*	2,800	2,826	2,848	2,776	2,787	2,788
Germany	4,466	4,374*	4,437	4,445	4,446	4,423	4,468	4,471
Hungary	1,334	1,340	1,406	1,395	1,403	1,341	1,341	1,333
Ireland	2,587	2,556*	2,616	2,629	2,647	2,592	2,594	2,594
Italy	1,030	1,035	1,094	1,087	1,102	1,035	1,037	1,036
Latvia	291	296	330	328	353	295	297	296
Lithuania	1,560	1,566	1,617	1,614	1,626	1,559	1,568	1,567
Netherlands	3,131	3,054	3,051	3,168	3,156	3,138	3,138	3,138
Poland	1,707	1,697*	1,763	1,733	1,757	1,714	1,715	1,708
Portugal	853	859	920	907	919	860	856	859
Slovakia	798	775*	827	845	865	800	804	805
Slovenia	1,179	1,155*	1,214	1,228	1,229	1,180	1,184	1,186
Spain	1,810	1,813	1,874	1,857	1,881	1,807	1,817	1,817
Sweden	2,632	2,627	2,657	2,670	2,692	2,638	2,640	2,637
UK	3,244	3,188*	3,229	3,268	3,275	3,223	3,250	3,244

Table A12: BIC values of ordered logit models predicting redistribution preferences - Casewise deletion

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	9,949	7,686*	7,781	9,737	9,759	9,674	9,663	9,593
Belgium	11,677	11,163*	11,205	11,345	11,347	11,310	11,316	11,292
Bulgaria	5,901	4,935*	4,982	5,753	5,770	5,701	5,715	5,675
Croatia	2,657	2,006*	2,075	2,537	2,547	2,493	2,493	2,487
Cyprus	2,961	2,403*	2,454	2,809	2,829	2,766	2,765	2,758
Czech Republic	16,069	11,615*	11,684	15,526	15,581	15,539	15,546	15,541
Denmark	7,554	7,005*	7,046	7,376	7,374	7,358	7,403	7,397
Estonia	13,065	9,069*	9,128	12,759	12,738	12,742	12,708	12,708
Finland	12,569	12,159	12,153	12,188	12,198	12,225	12,255	12,199
France	12,920	11,951*	11,965	12,545	12,567	12,509	12,419	12,360
Germany	18,238	16,474*	16,526	17,789	17,594	17,789	17,418	17,281
Hungary	9,882	6,582*	6,640	9,043	9,055	8,989	8,990	8,980
Ireland	16,125	12,466*	12,551	15,192	15,191	15,176	14,806	14,762
Italy	8,594	5,061*	5,122	7,393	7,378	7,353	7,326	7,281
Latvia	1,392	1,227*	1,261	1,425	1,445	1,388	1,387	1,388
Lithuania	10,699	9,093*	9,138	10,307	10,287	10,257	10,242	10,184
Netherlands	12,073	10,813*	10,781	11,836	11,832	11,867	11,820	11,776
Poland	10,775	8,067*	8,124	10,439	10,420	10,416	10,346	10,342
Portugal	7,148	5,292*	5,345	6,859	6,888	6,807	6,757	6,743
Slovakia	5,069	3,420*	3,492	4,833	4,852	4,789	4,802	4,790
Slovenia	7,396	6,178*	6,212	6,876	6,874	6,850	6,854	6,837
Spain	11,236	9,294*	9,348	10,716	10,743	10,668	10,668	10,618
Sweden	10,259	9,780	9,779	10,169	10,176	10,149	10,162	10,120
UK	14,205	12,417*	12,439	13,540	13,455	13,514	13,369	13,304

Table A13: BIC values of ordered logit models predicting redistribution preferences - Complete information

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	7,484	7,451*	7,544	7,549	7,574	7,486	7,489	7,491
Belgium	10,854	10,808*	10,850	10,881	10,883	10,847	10,862	10,858
Bulgaria	4,764	4,760	4,806	4,813	4,830	4,762	4,772	4,769
Croatia	1,904	1,903	1,967	1,951	1,964	1,910	1,911	1,908
Cyprus	2,239	2,245	2,297	2,283	2,305	2,244	2,245	2,246
Czech Republic	11,368	11,272*	11,341	11,352	11,400	11,350	11,366	11,376
Denmark	6,903	6,849*	6,888	6,883	6,894	6,873	6,911	6,910
Estonia	8,934	8,875*	8,934	8,939	8,956	8,915	8,942	8,941
Finland	11,900	11,819	11,818	11,829	11,846	11,872	11,900	11,892
France	11,551	11,456*	11,470	11,575	11,612	11,542	11,559	11,553
Germany	15,811	15,651*	15,705	15,767	15,721	15,763	15,807	15,818
Hungary	6,159	6,147*	6,206	6,222	6,225	6,166	6,167	6,167
Ireland	11,645	11,565*	11,646	11,674	11,684	11,647	11,653	11,653
Italy	4,389	4,385	4,445	4,441	4,428	4,394	4,396	4,395
Latvia	1,213	1,219	1,253	1,251	1,276	1,219	1,218	1,219
Lithuania	8,728	8,734	8,779	8,766	8,757	8,720	8,734	8,735
Netherlands	10,718	10,562*	10,533	10,706	10,700	10,725	10,726	10,726
Poland	7,876	7,829*	7,882	7,895	7,899	7,879	7,883	7,882
Portugal	5,039	5,045	5,099	5,099	5,123	5,047	5,047	5,044
Slovakia	3,289	3,230*	3,302	3,314	3,335	3,273	3,295	3,295
Slovenia	5,788	5,752*	5,797	5,810	5,816	5,784	5,795	5,796
Spain	8,868	8,845*	8,899	8,920	8,948	8,872	8,875	8,873
Sweden	9,713	9,664	9,664	9,730	9,733	9,710	9,721	9,720
UK	11,831	11,722*	11,747	11,824	11,811	11,791	11,839	11,831

Table A14: BIC values of OLS models predicting redistribution preferences - Casewise deletion

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	12,634	9,711*	9,810	12,348	12,376	12,297	12,285	12,195
Belgium	15,446	14,786*	14,807	14,970	14,966	14,942	14,940	14,915
Bulgaria	7,585	6,294*	6,324	7,350	7,361	7,313	7,329	7,281
Croatia	3,389	2,581*	2,647	3,215	3,226	3,175	3,174	3,171
Cyprus	3,677	3,016*	3,061	3,481	3,507	3,451	3,450	3,441
Czech Republic	20,880	15,152*	15,209	20,178	20,231	20,200	20,201	20,195
Denmark	10,443	9,688*	9,721	10,199	10,197	10,188	10,233	10,226
Estonia	16,634	11,497*	11,546	16,221	16,195	16,216	16,176	16,175
Finland	15,814	15,334*	15,286	15,330	15,327	15,396	15,416	15,344
France	17,198	15,955*	15,937	16,659	16,686	16,637	16,513	16,433
Germany	24,003	21,800*	21,838	23,438	23,188	23,455	22,940	22,758
Hungary	12,036	8,010*	8,064	10,913	10,925	10,871	10,872	10,860
Ireland	21,244	16,415*	16,484	20,023	20,024	20,028	19,529	19,482
Italy	10,348	6,134*	6,188	8,909	8,898	8,876	8,834	8,775
Latvia	1,818	1,613*	1,638	1,845	1,863	1,808	1,809	1,810
Lithuania	12,762	10,884*	10,928	12,322	12,293	12,278	12,247	12,175
Netherlands	16,124	14,540*	14,506	15,821	15,807	15,850	15,785	15,721
Poland	14,198	10,596*	10,639	13,721	13,689	13,713	13,620	13,615
Portugal	9,135	6,817*	6,858	8,719	8,743	8,680	8,612	8,595
Slovakia	6,473	4,321*	4,386	6,143	6,161	6,106	6,111	6,091
Slovenia	9,680	8,116	8,112	8,994	8,986	8,976	8,982	8,956
Spain	14,769	12,231*	12,264	14,050	14,075	14,014	14,015	13,938
Sweden	12,550	11,986*	11,969	12,429	12,436	12,416	12,426	12,378
UK	18,081	15,860*	15,874	17,252	17,145	17,227	17,034	16,949

Note: * SES conceptualization with the lowest BIC and at least a 10 point difference with the second lowest BIC

Table A15: BIC values of OLS models predicting redistribution preferences - Complete information

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	9,469	9,424*	9,522	9,520	9,552	9,471	9,476	9,477
Belgium	14,326	14,292*	14,315	14,350	14,346	14,322	14,334	14,332
Bulgaria	6,064	6,057	6,086	6,096	6,104	6,057	6,071	6,065
Croatia	2,457	2,456	2,511	2,502	2,518	2,463	2,463	2,463
Cyprus	2,829	2,835	2,880	2,861	2,885	2,831	2,835	2,835
Czech Republic	14,798	14,713*	14,770	14,777	14,825	14,780	14,796	14,806
Denmark	9,532	9,479*	9,510	9,505	9,515	9,502	9,540	9,539
Estonia	11,286	11,236*	11,285	11,278	11,294	11,267	11,294	11,293
Finland	14,957	14,895*	14,853	14,867	14,872	14,937	14,958	14,951
France	15,375	15,283*	15,266	15,384	15,426	15,365	15,382	15,374
Germany	20,861	20,706*	20,745	20,796	20,744	20,808	20,862	20,867
Hungary	7,482	7,480	7,533	7,534	7,528	7,488	7,489	7,488
Ireland	15,382	15,278*	15,340	15,392	15,403	15,384	15,390	15,390
Italy	5,310	5,305	5,359	5,351	5,350	5,314	5,317	5,315
Latvia	1,595	1,601	1,626	1,634	1,655	1,600	1,601	1,601
Lithuania	10,465	10,471	10,514	10,501	10,495	10,458	10,471	10,471
Netherlands	14,333	14,192*	14,162	14,322	14,311	14,340	14,341	14,341
Poland	10,326	10,280*	10,314	10,333	10,330	10,331	10,333	10,331
Portugal	6,462	6,468	6,512	6,509	6,528	6,470	6,470	6,465
Slovakia	4,127	4,072*	4,135	4,145	4,163	4,115	4,134	4,133
Slovenia	7,609	7,571*	7,584	7,624	7,620	7,605	7,617	7,616
Spain	11,657	11,637*	11,669	11,694	11,724	11,658	11,664	11,661
Sweden	11,885	11,842*	11,830	11,900	11,904	11,884	11,893	11,892
UK	15,090	14,982*	14,995	15,080	15,056	15,050	15,098	15,089

Note: * SES conceptualization with the lowest BIC and at least a 10 point difference with the second lowest BIC

Table A16: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences without control for education - Casewise deletion

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	4,261	3,268*	3,348	4,183	4,216	4,138	4,140	4,117
Belgium	5,599	5,281*	5,303	5,417	5,425	5,385	5,400	5,420
Bulgaria	2,188	1,729*	1,776	2,129	2,142	2,091	2,126	2,097
Croatia	1,031	777*	835	1,019	1,037	973	973	968
Cyprus	1,267	1,002*	1,047	1,216	1,241	1,182	1,183	1,179
Czech Republic	8,322	5,958*	6,019	7,961	8,022	7,985	7,988	8,047
Denmark	3,944	3,638*	3,683	3,872	3,851	3,830	3,854	3,859
Estonia	6,232	4,373*	4,433	5,965	5,969	5,977	6,053	6,045
Finland	5,818	5,543	5,531*	5,547	5,555	5,586	5,644	5,615
France	5,898	5,364	5,360	5,675	5,716	5,644	5,660	5,611
Germany	8,636	7,713*	7,770	8,377	8,293	8,375	8,188	8,169
Hungary	3,799	2,480*	2,550	3,486	3,500	3,440	3,451	3,451
Ireland	7,600	5,677*	5,747	7,068	7,070	7,086	6,904	6,925
Italy	3,595	2,002*	2,073	3,105	3,105	3,058	3,042	3,059
Latvia	585	515*	549	629	644	584	587	587
Lithuania	3,673	3,047*	3,094	3,531	3,539	3,477	3,477	3,469
Netherlands	6,375	5,622	5,609*	6,219	6,229	6,271	6,214	6,220
Poland	4,930	3,571*	3,641	4,628	4,611	4,689	4,703	4,671
Portugal	2,174	1,643*	1,699	2,084	2,106	2,040	2,018	2,015
Slovakia	2,322	1,463*	1,543	2,221	2,236	2,178	2,194	2,191
Slovenia	2,933	2,300*	2,349	2,634	2,600	2,648	2,668	2,687
Spain	4,420	3,596*	3,649	4,208	4,237	4,166	4,180	4,174
Sweden	5,251	4,990*	5,014	5,216	5,241	5,191	5,191	5,185
UK	7,222	6,217*	6,257	6,855	6,827	6,825	6,643	6,746

Note: * SES conceptualization with the lowest BIC and at least a 10 point difference with the second lowest BIC

Table A17: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences without control for education - Complete information

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	3,189	3,172*	3,251	3,236	3,270	3,186	3,195	3,195
Belgium	5,169	5,105*	5,127	5,148	5,153	5,115	5,165	5,160
Bulgaria	1,707	1,680	1,724	1,714	1,726	1,682	1,710	1,693
Croatia	741	747	800	793	816	748	748	746
Cyprus	927	931	978	958	986	925	933	933
Czech Republic	5,846	5,756*	5,813	5,790	5,838	5,797	5,830	5,854
Denmark	3,587	3,547*	3,592	3,606	3,597	3,568	3,594	3,593
Estonia	4,398	4,282*	4,341	4,318	4,342	4,315	4,388	4,387
Finland	5,481	5,373	5,362	5,368	5,382	5,411	5,469	5,458
France	5,257	5,146	5,142	5,228	5,278	5,202	5,264	5,237
Germany	7,424	7,283*	7,345	7,364	7,347	7,354	7,416	7,420
Hungary	2,338	2,333	2,400	2,388	2,391	2,337	2,344	2,345
Ireland	5,358	5,233*	5,301	5,327	5,328	5,337	5,359	5,360
Italy	1,735	1,727	1,796	1,779	1,783	1,729	1,741	1,737
Latvia	507	511	546	556	571	511	513	513
Lithuania	2,896	2,903	2,947	2,933	2,939	2,873*	2,903	2,900
Netherlands	5,632	5,477	5,466*	5,597	5,603	5,638	5,635	5,636
Poland	3,585	3,468	3,533	3,473	3,472	3,527	3,580	3,553
Portugal	1,544	1,544	1,600	1,581	1,603	1,543	1,538	1,534
Slovakia	1,459	1,379*	1,458	1,471	1,490	1,433	1,466	1,458
Slovenia	2,243	2,113*	2,173	2,188	2,163	2,202	2,239	2,243
Spain	3,457	3,417*	3,468	3,463	3,502	3,428	3,454	3,451
Sweden	4,945	4,915*	4,940	4,964	4,982	4,937	4,953	4,953
UK	5,864	5,769*	5,813	5,856	5,857	5,814	5,868	5,854

Note: * SES conceptualization with the lowest BIC and at least a 10 point difference with the second lowest BIC

Table A18: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences without control variables – Casewise deletion

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	4,253	3,252	3,333	4,174	4,205	4,126	4,134	4,108
Belgium	5,586	5,265	5,277	5,390	5,392	5,362	5,386	5,398
Bulgaria	2,144	1,685	1,731	2,085	2,098	2,047	2,082	2,053
Cyprus	1,235	965	1,010	1,182	1,207	1,149	1,150	1,147
Czech Republic	8326	5,936	5,988	7,962	8025	7,966	7,995	8050
Germany	8604	7,677	7,727	8344	8254	8342	8158	8134
Denmark	3,924	3,616	3,654	3,848	3,812	3,806	3,834	3,839
Estonia	6,287	4,358	4,406	5,992	5,980	6,016	6,104	6,087
Spain	4,371	3,548	3,600	4,159	4,189	4,117	4,134	4,125
Finland	5,882	5,619	5,585	5,591	5,602	5,641	5,717	5,672
France	5,902	5,370	5,357	5,666	5,713	5,646	5,663	5,609
UK	7,194	6,181	6,222	6,819	6,789	6,793	6,618	6,713
Croatia	999	739	796	992	1,007	944	944	940
Hungary	3,750	2,434	2,504	3,438	3,452	3,392	3,403	3,403
Ireland	7,579	5,657	5,716	7,048	7,053	7,075	6,886	6,905
Italy	3,564	1,980	2,049	3,078	3,075	3,017	3,015	3,030
Lithuania	3,657	3,025	3,067	3,506	3,513	3,453	3,457	3,450
Latvia	566	490	524	606	622	564	567	568
Netherlands	6,375	5,630	5,597	6,211	6,220	6,270	6,217	6,217
Poland	4,917	3,542	3,604	4,605	4,586	4,670	4,689	4,655
Portugal	2,142	1,610	1,665	2,049	2,070	2,008	1,986	1,982
Sweden	5,265	5,006	5,022	5,221	5,234	5,203	5,203	5,201
Slovenia	2,904	2,262	2,306	2,605	2,570	2,618	2,639	2,655
Slovakia	2,314	1,443	1,519	2,205	2,219	2,162	2,181	2,178

Table A19: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences for without control variables - Complete information

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	3,174	3,155	3,235	3,219	3,252	3,169	3,182	3,180
Belgium	5,147	5,082	5,095	5,118	5,118	5,088	5,147	5,135
Bulgaria	1,664	1,636	1,680	1,672	1,685	1,639	1,666	1,650
Cyprus	891	896	942	921	948	888	897	897
Czech Republic	5,841	5,733	5,781	5,782	5,832	5,782	5,828	5,848
Germany	7,386	7,244	7,301	7,325	7,302	7,315	7,381	7,380
Denmark	3,565	3,526	3,564	3,580	3,559	3,542	3,573	3,571
Estonia	4,405	4,263	4,311	4,312	4,328	4,317	4,399	4,389
Spain	3,409	3,369	3,419	3,415	3,455	3,380	3,407	3,403
Finland	5,549	5,451	5,420	5,419	5,436	5,470	5,546	5,519
France	5,262	5,152	5,138	5,220	5,280	5,206	5,269	5,237
UK	5,836	5,732	5,778	5,821	5,818	5,783	5,842	5,823
Croatia	705	710	763	759	780	712	712	711
Hungary	2,293	2,288	2,356	2,344	2,346	2,292	2,299	2,300
Ireland	5,344	5,215	5,272	5,306	5,312	5,324	5,344	5,343
Italy	1,708	1,701	1,769	1,753	1,756	1,703	1,714	1,709
Lithuania	2,875	2,879	2,917	2,904	2,909	2,846	2,881	2,878
Latvia	485	486	521	530	545	489	489	491
Netherlands	5,636	5,484	5,452	5,593	5,600	5,641	5,641	5,639
Poland	3,569	3,439	3,497	3,448	3,447	3,505	3,562	3,534
Portugal	1,513	1,512	1,568	1,548	1,568	1,511	1,506	1,501
Sweden	4,954	4,932	4,948	4,963	4,971	4,945	4,961	4,962
Slovenia	2,214	2,078	2,134	2,160	2,132	2,172	2,211	2,212
Slovakia	1,452	1,354	1,430	1,461	1,478	1,425	1,458	1,450

Table A20: Preferred model according to BIC after multiple imputation

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Risks	Skills	RTI	Total
Austria	7	1	0	0	2	0	0	10
Belgium	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
Bulgaria	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
Croatia	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Cyprus	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Czech Republic	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
Denmark	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
Estonia	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
Finland	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
France	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
Germany	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
Hungary	1	9	0	0	0	0	0	10
Ireland	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
Italy	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
Latvia	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	10
Netherlands	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
Poland	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
Portugal	5	3	0	0	0	0	2	10
Slovakia	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
Slovenia	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
Spain	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
Sweden	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
UK	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10

Note: Cells denote the number of times a model is preferre

Table A21: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences for waves 2012 and 2014 - Casewise deletion

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	2,392	2,397	2,458	2,452	2,477	2,399	2,400	2,400
Belgium	2,519	2,511	2,542	2,570	2,578	2,520	2,525	2,525
Bulgaria	797	802	857	823	853	801	803	801
Cyprus	375	381	408	420	433	381	381	380
Czech Republic	3,178	3,158	3,213	3,192	3,241	3,179	3,180	3,182
Germany	3,553	3,526	3,589	3,587	3,602	3,544	3,556	3,560
Denmark	1,208	1,197	1,241	1,250	1,257	1,215	1,215	1,212
Estonia	3,122	3,093	3,159	3,155	3,171	3,111	3,128	3,130
Spain	1,668	1,658	1,709	1,706	1,737	1,653	1,674	1,671
Finland	2,545	2,506	2,534	2,552	2,586	2,537	2,552	2,548
France	2,506	2,492	2,509	2,554	2,577	2,506	2,514	2,509
UK	2,878	2,850	2,914	2,917	2,936	2,867	2,885	2,882
Croatia	759	765	818	811	833	765	766	762
Hungary	987	991	1,050	1,040	1,056	992	991	988
Ireland	2,771	2,725	2,793	2,804	2,812	2,756	2,779	2,779
Italy	1,484	1,480	1,546	1,536	1,541	1,487	1,491	1,488
Lithuania	1,437	1,444	1,496	1,491	1,496	1,433	1,445	1,444
Latvia	525	529	564	574	589	529	529	531
Netherlands	2,578	2,540	2,570	2,619	2,631	2,583	2,585	2,585
Poland	1,695	1,676	1,743	1,730	1,738	1,702	1,701	1,702
Portugal	907	914	969	955	978	912	912	913
Sweden	2,399	2,393	2,433	2,431	2,457	2,398	2,403	2,406
Slovenia	1,169	1,128	1,191	1,215	1,212	1,156	1,176	1,177
Slovakia	614	600	649	652	673	614	619	618

Note: * SES conceptualization with the lowest BIC and at least a 10 point difference with the second lowest BIC

Table A22: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences for waves 2012 and 2014 - Complete information

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	1,101	865	935	1,121	1,142	1,078	1,077	1,077
Belgium	2,858	2,715	2,766	2,830	2,830	2,787	2,791	2,782
Bulgaria	1,204	948	995	1,234	1,245	1,183	1,188	1,181
Cyprus	804	656	703	793	822	754	755	753
Czech Republic	3,779	2,723	2,785	3,682	3,710	3,641	3,652	3,648
Germany	4,600	4,095	4,155	4,496	4,417	4,472	4,350	4,318
Denmark	2,649	2,453	2,503	2,632	2,627	2,584	2,616	2,613
Estonia	2,906	1,265	1,313	2,846	2,849	2,818	2,793	2,795
Spain	2,277	1,954	2,013	2,177	2,197	2,130	2,129	2,119
Finland	3,093	2,983	3,015	3,048	3,037	3,025	3,028	3,022
France	3,035	2,826	2,873	2,987	3,015	2,941	2,934	2,911
UK	3,683	3,168	3,201	3,503	3,510	3,467	3,474	3,462
Hungary	2,014	1,476	1,538	1,895	1,907	1,840	1,839	1,840
Ireland	3,596	2,780	2,837	3,417	3,425	3,374	3,235	3,226
Italy	582	363	406	540	555	498	484	477
Lithuania	1,986	1,628	1,684	1,920	1,943	1,876	1,870	1,863
Netherlands	3,462	3,077	3,094	3,407	3,417	3,400	3,393	3,379
Poland	2,349	1,857	1,915	2,314	2,326	2,283	2,273	2,269
Portugal	1,196	791	848	1,130	1,149	1,080	1,064	1,061
Sweden	2,794	2,634	2,671	2,814	2,830	2,776	2,777	2,762
Slovenia	1,368	1,085	1,129	1,262	1,264	1,234	1,235	1,235
Slovakia	1,521	902	970	1,485	1,501	1,436	1,438	1,436

Note: * SES conceptualization with the lowest BIC and at least a 10 point difference with the second lowest BI

Table A23: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences for waves 2016 and 2018 - Casewise deletion

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	2,235	1,726	1,781	2,230	2,252	2,178	2,179	2,160
Belgium	2,958	2,799	2,838	2,918	2,932	2,872	2,877	2,869
Bulgaria	1,300	1,047	1,094	1,325	1,341	1,274	1,283	1,270
Cyprus	650	518	563	644	668	608	608	607
Czech Republic	4,274	3,101	3,168	4,169	4,201	4,143	4,143	4,151
Germany	5,114	4,574	4,638	4,992	4,968	4,983	4,934	4,884
Denmark	2,298	2,125	2,173	2,279	2,290	2,238	2,252	2,249
Estonia	3,017	2,225	2,293	3,020	3,027	2,968	2,962	2,961
Spain	2,328	1,908	1,969	2,247	2,269	2,193	2,201	2,197
Finland	3,116	2,967	2,991	3,024	3,038	3,005	3,040	3,019
France	3,163	2,862	2,902	3,113	3,131	3,060	3,053	3,033
UK	3,927	3,350	3,394	3,792	3,789	3,756	3,727	3,710
Croatia	568	461	506	571	580	525	525	525
Hungary	2,046	1,410	1,476	1,956	1,967	1,901	1,902	1,895
Ireland	3,705	2,773	2,839	3,506	3,525	3,477	3,385	3,382
Italy	1,970	1,166	1,227	1,783	1,797	1,728	1,721	1,715
Lithuania	1,960	1,627	1,682	1,942	1,957	1,888	1,890	1,876
Latvia	344	296	331	383	401	345	348	348
Netherlands	3,550	3,117	3,112	3,533	3,528	3,510	3,490	3,479
Poland	2,282	1,737	1,808	2,237	2,253	2,213	2,203	2,191
Portugal	1,192	932	993	1,149	1,169	1,100	1,088	1,090
Sweden	2,775	2,646	2,674	2,796	2,822	2,763	2,766	2,756
Slovenia	1,480	1,208	1,266	1,463	1,459	1,412	1,420	1,420
Slovakia	1,271	803	859	1,284	1,297	1,234	1,234	1,232

Table A24: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences for waves 2016 and 2018 - Complete information

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	1,669	1,673	1,728	1,725	1,745	1,672	1,676	1,676
Belgium	2,729	2,720	2,760	2,774	2,788	2,729	2,736	2,731
Bulgaria	1,021	1,019	1,066	1,065	1,089	1,021	1,028	1,025
Cyprus	469	474	520	,07	525	473	475	475
Czech Republic	3,035	3,015	3,080	3,052	3,077	3,028	3,030	3,042
Germany	4,466	4,374	4,437	4,445	4,446	4,423	4,468	4,471
Denmark	2,099	2,074	2,120	2,133	2,150	2,094	2,106	2,106
Estonia	2,202	2,187	2,253	2,251	2,267	2,198	2,209	2,209
Spain	1,810	1,813	1,874	1,857	1,881	1,807	1,817	1,817
Finland	2,913	2,881	2,906	2,893	2,911	2,881	2,914	2,905
France	2,781	2,758	2,800	2,826	2,848	2,776	2,787	2,788
UK	3,244	3,188	3,229	3,268	3,275	3,223	3,250	3,244
Croatia	430	435	476	480	491	436	436	435
Hungary	1,334	1,340	1,406	1,395	1,403	1,341	1,341	1,333
Ireland	2,587	2,556	2,616	2,629	2,647	2,592	2,594	2,594
Italy	1,030	1,035	1,094	1,087	1,102	1,035	1,037	1,036
Lithuania	1,560	1,566	1,617	1,614	1,626	1,559	1,568	1,567
Latvia	291	296	330	328	353	295	297	296
Netherlands	3,131	3,054	3,051	3,168	3,156	3,138	3,138	3,138
Poland	1,707	1,697	1,763	1,733	1,757	1,714	1,715	1,708
Portugal	853	859	920	907	919	860	856	859
Sweden	2,632	2,627	2,657	2,670	2,692	2,638	2,640	2,637
Slovenia	1,179	1,155	1,214	1,228	1,229	1,180	1,184	1,186
Slovakia	798	775	827	845	865	800	804	805

Table A25: AIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences - Casewise deletion

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	4,168	3,189*	3,215	4,052	4,068	4,055	4,054	4,025
Belgium	5,414	5,141	5,116*	5,237	5,219	5,247	5,257	5,246
Bulgaria	2,093	1,655	1,657	2,024	2,022	2,024	2,039	2,015
Croatia	992	738*	752	936	939	929	930	922
Cyprus	1,220	953	954	1,129	1,139	1,132	1,131	1,128
Czech Republic	8,067	5,805	5,808	7,744	7,778	7,790	7,802	7,799
Denmark	3,848	3,550	3,540*	3,727	3,699	3,735	3,767	3,762
Estonia	5,982	4,246	4,253	5,790	5,776	5,827	5,820	5,820
Finland	5,655	5,423	5,368*	5,407	5,393	5,473	5,492	5,469
France	5,732	5,255	5,208*	5,519	5,533	5,532	5,509	5,472
Germany	8,458	7,581	7,581	8,185	8,084	8,233	8,077	8,012
Hungary	3,690	2,403*	2,417	3,350	3,345	3,348	3,349	3,342
Ireland	7,331	5,523*	5,537	6,834	6,821	6,871	6,705	6,685
Italy	3,462	1,926*	1,944	2,957	2,940	2,954	2,949	2,932
Latvia	556	483	479	561	564	551	553	554
Lithuania	3,569	2,959	2,951	3,386	3,378	3,384	3,386	3,367
Netherlands	6,230	5,524*	5,458	6,059	6,047	6,123	6,097	6,075
Poland	4,640	3,421*	3,437	4,447	4,414	4,476	4,442	4,438
Portugal	2,095	1,568	1,574	1,963	1,966	1,963	1,943	1,939
Slovakia	2,231	1,400*	1,428	2,110	2,110	2,107	2,111	2,108
Slovenia	2,685	2,157	2,152	2,431	2,399	2,443	2,453	2,451
Spain	4,294	3,504	3,505	4,057	4,070	4,063	4,073	4,054
Sweden	5,146	4,898	4,870*	5,075	5,075	5,097	5,103	5,078
UK	6,972	6,037	6,023*	6,586	6,541	6,609	6,554	6,517

Note: * SES conceptualization with the lowest AIC and at least a 10 point difference with the second lowest AIC

Table A26: AIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences – Complete information

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	3,116	3,097*	3,122	3,118	3,135	3,116	3,118	3,118
Belgium	5,021	4,991	4,967*	5,001	4,982	5,010	5,022	5,019
Bulgaria	1,618	1,606	1,606	1,609	1,608	1,610	1,620	1,613
Croatia	707	708	719	716	724	708	709	705
Cyprus	881	883	885	876	889	878	883	883
Czech Republic	5,688	5,634	5,634	5,634	5,659	5,669	5,680	5,689
Denmark	3,509	3,467	3,458	3,474	3,456	3,484	3,510	3,509
Estonia	4,217	4,159	4,166	4,174	4,181	4,198	4,217	4,218
Finland	5,325	5,255	5,202*	5,231	5,223	5,300	5,318	5,317
France	5,111	5,043	4,994*	5,076	5,100	5,094	5,113	5,103
Germany	7,317	7,201	7,204	7,235	7,198	7,273	7,310	7,317
Hungary	2,256	2,255	2,268	2,266	2,249	2,258	2,258	2,253
Ireland	5,185	5,118*	5,129	5,159	5,146	5,185	5,187	5,187
Italy	1,678	1,669	1,687	1,678	1,666	1,672	1,679	1,676
Latvia	478	479	476	490	492	479	479	480
Lithuania	2,815	2,817	2,807	2,808	2,796	2,798	2,817	2,816
Netherlands	5,515	5,395	5,332*	5,464	5,449	5,517	5,517	5,517
Poland	3,362	3,320	3,331	3,321	3,304*	3,359	3,363	3,362
Portugal	1,468	1,470	1,477	1,468	1,474	1,470	1,465	1,462
Slovakia	1,381	1,319*	1,348	1,372	1,375	1,371	1,382	1,380
Slovenia	2,034	1,979	1,986	2,013	1,988	2,024	2,036	2,035
Spain	3,358	3,337	3,337	3,335	3,357	3,348	3,358	3,355
Sweden	4,867	4,841	4,813*	4,843	4,838	4,863	4,869	4,868
UK	5,784	5,698	5,684*	5,734	5,716	5,743	5,785	5,774

Note: * SES conceptualization with the lowest AIC and at least a 10 point difference with the second lowest A

Table A27: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences (income is baseline model) - Casewise deletion

Country	Income	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	3,274	3,287	3,322	3,237	3,237	3,209
Belgium	5,237	5,141	5,144	5,095	5,097	5,086
Bulgaria	1,730	1,743	1,759	1,695	1,702	1,680
Cyprus	1,017	985	1,014	950	954	953
Czech Republic	5,900	5,769	5,807	5,743	5,739	5,739
Germany	7,683	7,576	7,508	7,544	7,383	7,316
Denmark	3,633	3,586	3,589	3,543	3,557	3,550
Estonia	4,333	4,291	4,312	4,257	4,260	4,261
Spain	3,599	3,481	3,525	3,446	3,450	3,437
Finland	5,521	5,369	5,374	5,371	5,374	5,356
France	5,352	5,241	5,276	5,198	5,165	5,139
UK	6,134	5,944	5,926	5,896	5,826	5,797
Croatia	795	818	839	771	772	769
Hungary	2,493	2,409	2,410	2,352	2,353	2,346
Ireland	5,621	5,419	5,422	5,381	5,260	5,244
Italy	2,007	1,824	1,828	1,772	1,762	1,755
Lithuania	3,055	2,991	2,993	2,932	2,940	2,920
Latvia	533	579	594	534	534	535
Netherlands	5,620	5,511	5,524	5,484	5,464	5,440
Poland	3,513	3,471	3,474	3,453	3,436	3,434
Portugal	1,656	1,626	1,646	1,578	1,560	1,556
Sweden	4,992	4,996	5,012	4,960	4,961	4,936
Slovenia	2,246	2,130	2,124	2,087	2,092	2,089
Slovakia	1,469	1,459	1,475	1,412	1,414	1,413

Table A28: BIC values of logit models predicting redistribution preferences (income is the baseline model) – Complete information

Country	Income	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	3,182	3,259	3,293	3,208	3,209	3,209
Belgium	5,087	5,129	5,131	5,082	5,087	5,086
Bulgaria	1,680	1,726	1,742	1,679	1,686	1,680
Cyprus	946	984	1,012	948	952	953
Czech Republic	5,729	5,754	5,794	5,728	5,732	5,739
Germany	7,302	7,330	7,325	7,299	7,311	7,315
Denmark	3,550	3,582	3,585	3,539	3,553	3,550
Estonia	4,246	4,284	4,311	4,250	4,260	4,261
Spain	3,431	3,472	3,514	3,435	3,440	3,437
Finland	5,352	5,347	5,355	5,349	5,354	5,356
France	5,139	5,178	5,220	5,139	5,145	5,139
UK	5,794	5,837	5,846	5,788	5,805	5,797
Croatia	765	818	839	771	772	769
Hungary	2,344	2,408	2,410	2,352	2,352	2,346
Ireland	5,215	5,283	5,292	5,244	5,244	5,244
Italy	1,747	1,805	1,811	1,754	1,759	1,755
Lithuania	2,913	2,962	2,969	2,902	2,921	2,920
Latvia	529	579	594	534	534	535
Netherlands	5,490	5,467	5,485	5,440	5,440	5,440
Poland	3,411	3,452	3,455	3,433	3,435	3,434
Portugal	1,557	1,609	1,633	1,564	1,559	1,556
Sweden	4,935	4,972	4,988	4,937	4,938	4,936
Slovenia	2,067	2,127	2,122	2,084	2,089	2,089
Slovakia	1,387	1,457	1,474	1,410	1,413	1,413

Table A29: BIC values of OLS models predicting preferences for government responsibility - Casewise deletion

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	5,098	3,660*	3,720	5,003	5,015	4,956	4,956	4,901
Belgium	3,282	3,214	3,248	3,205	3,235	3,184	3,185	3,182
Czech Republic	5,409	4,227*	4,277	5,319	5,338	5,284	5,283	5,280
Estonia	4,150	4,047*	4,113	4,105	4,126	4,059	4,075	4,076
Finland	3,263	3,188	3,240	3,121*	3,144	3,086	3,087	3,071
France	4,073	3,807*	3,849	3,969	3,964	3,933	3,837	3,832
Germany	5,997	5,425*	5,482	5,929	5,890	5,884	5,756	5,698
Hungary	3,512	2,269*	2,310	3,012	3,028	2,971	2,970	2,964
Ireland	5,803	4,399*	4,508	5,482	5,498	5,434	5,372	5,359
Italy	5,252	3,014*	3,068	4,528	4,552	4,492	4,494	4,481
Lithuania	4,447	3,892*	3,912	4,338	4,339	4,292	4,278	4,281
Netherlands	2,921	2,690*	2,738	2,916	2,935	2,876	2,875	2,868
Poland	3,797	2,890*	2,937	3,726	3,722	3,686	3,667	3,663
Portugal	2,486	2,324*	2,367	2,484	2,514	2,449	2,448	2,446
Spain	4,110	3,319*	3,368	4,024	4,044	3,988	3,989	3,962
Sweden	2,761	2,678*	2,712	2,777	2,784	2,739	2,740	2,731
UK	3,594	3,221*	3,267	3,488	3,485	3,441	3,409	3,389
UK	2,803	2,434*	2,479	2,734	2,747	2,691	2,694	2,679

Note: * SES conceptualization with the lowest BIC and at least a 10 point difference with the second lowest BIC

Table A30: BIC values of OLS models predicting preferences for government responsibility - Complete information

Country	Null	Income	Deciles	ESeC	Kitschelt	Risks	Skills	RTI
Austria	3,536	3,517*	3,571	3,585	3,604	3,542	3,541	3,541
Belgium	3,116	3,122	3,156	3,142	3,172	3,122	3,123	3,122
Czech Republic	4,145	4,137	4,187	4,181	4,201	4,149	4,152	4,152
Estonia	3,989	3,967*	4,032	4,026	4,048	3,981	3,996	3,996
Finland	3,000	2,994	3,049	3,039	3,064	3,004	3,005	3,006
France	3,579	3,570	3,611	3,624	3,628	3,586	3,583	3,586
Germany	5,204	5,172*	5,224	5,244	5,251	5,197	5,210	5,211
Hungary	1,952	1,958	1,996	1,992	2,012	1,957	1,957	1,958
Ireland	4,132	4,067*	4,179	4,185	4,200	4,136	4,138	4,139
Italy	2,600	2,589*	2,641	2,626	2,654	2,604	2,607	2,605
Lithuania	3,793	3,782*	3,806	3,845	3,850	3,800	3,796	3,799
Netherlands	2,648	2,634*	2,680	2,696	2,713	2,655	2,653	2,655
Poland	2,825	2,813*	2,857	2,868	2,863	2,828	2,832	2,829
Portugal	2,287	2,288	2,334	2,328	2,357	2,293	2,291	2,293
Slovenia	2,335	2,327	2,371	2,379	2,392	2,335	2,341	2,341
Spain	3,228	3,229	3,279	3,275	3,291	3,233	3,234	3,234
Sweden	2,643	2,650	2,684	2,686	2,691	2,649	2,650	2,649
UK	3,041	3,030*	3,075	3,089	3,092	3,043	3,048	3,047

Note: * SES conceptualization with the lowest BIC and at least a 10 point difference with the second lowest BIC

8.2 Appendix B

Variables and Definitions

Dependent variable

The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels

1. Agree + agree strongly

Disagree + disagree strongly + neither agree nor disagree

SES operationalizations

Income decile

First decile

. . .

10.Tenth decile

Linear income. The log of per capita equivalized net income

$$ln\frac{(y_{up}-y_{lo})/2}{\sqrt{h}}$$

where y_{up} is the upper bound of the income decile of the household, y_{lo} is the lower bound of the income decile of the household and h is household size.

Skill specificity: The absolute skill specificity is defined as the ratio of the share of occupations within the ISCO-08 occupational group over the share of labor force in this occupational group. Relative skill specificity is defined as the absolute skill specificity divided by the skill level. Skill level can be measured by a) the ISCO measure of skill level for each particular occupational group or b) the individual educational level. This gives raise to two measures of skill specificity: s_1 and s_2.$as_j = \frac{\frac{OC4_j}{OCT}}{\frac{l_j}{pa}}$ where as_j is absolute skill specificity for the j two digits ISCO-08 occupational group, $OC4_j$ is the number of occupations at four digits ISCO-08 within the j occupational group, OCT is the total number of occupations in ISCO-08, l_j is the working population in the j occupational group and pa is the total active population.

$$s_1 = \frac{as_j}{sk_{ij}}, \qquad s_2 = \frac{as_j}{ed_i}$$

where sk_{ij} is the the ISCO-08 skill level for individual i in ISCO-08 group j and ed_i is the educational level of individual i. Our measure of skill specificity is the average of s_1 and s_2. *Risk of unemployment*. Unemployment rate at one digit ISCO-08 using data from EU Labor Force Survey.

RTI. We use RTI scores from http://www.lisdatacenter.org/resources/other-databases/, prepared by Mahutga, Curran and Roberts (2018), where RTI is measured as the difference between the log of routine and the sum of the log of abstract and the log of manual.

ESeC.

1. Large employers, higher grade professional, administrative and managerial occupations
2. Lower grade professional, administrative and managerial occupations and higher grade technician and supervisory occupationsIntermediate occupations
3. Small employer and self employed occupations
4. Self employed occupations
5. Lower supervisory and lower technician occupations
6. Lower services, sales and clerical occupations
7. Lower technical occupations
8. Routine occupations

Kitschelt & Rehm.

1. Higher grade managers
2. Technical experts
3. Socio-cultural professionals
4. Associate managers
5. Technicians
6. Socio-cultural semi-professionals
7. Skilled office
8. Skilled crafts
9. Skilled service
10. Unskilled routine
11. Routine operatives/agriculture
12. Routine service

GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU

In person

All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the address of the centre nearest you at: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en

On the phone or by email

Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this service:

- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls),

- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or

- by electronic mail via: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en

FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU

Online

Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa website at: https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en

EU publications

You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publications. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en).

The European Commission's science and knowledge service

Joint Research Centre

JRC Mission

As the science and knowledge service of the European Commission, the Joint Research Centre's mission is to support EU policies with independent evidence throughout the whole policy cycle.

EU Science Hub

ec.europa.eu/jrc

@EU_ScienceHub

EU Science Hub - Joint Research Centre

EU Science, Research and Innovation

EU Science Hub